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T HE MANNER of bringing the decision of the Industrial
Commission before the appropriate circuit court for
review has already been discussed at length. If the proper
steps have been taken within the allotted time, that court is
now ready to perform its function in the process of reviewing
the administrative determination. Before it is possible to con-
sider how that function is to be performed, however, it is
necessary to digress sufficiently to cover the question of the
jurisdictional power of the courts to grant review in such
cases.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF POWER
The first Workmen's Compensation Act of Illinois, en-
acted in 1913, confined review of the commission's decision to
the Supreme Court' so that authority to act was lacking in the
several circuit courts. A test of the jurisdiction so conferred
was made in the landmark case of Courter v. Simpson Con-
struction Company' wherein the employer sued out a writ of
certiorari to review the decision of the commission. The
* Part I of this article appeared in 23 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW pp. 205 et seq.
1Laws 1913, p. 349, being Section 19(f) of the statute, provided: "The decision
of the Industrial Board . . . and of the committee of arbitration, where no
review is had and its decision becomes the decision of the Industrial Board . . .
shall, in the absence of fraud, be conclusive, but the Supreme Court shall have
power to review questions of law involved in any such decision . . . by certiorari,
mandamus or by any other method permissible under the rules and practices of said
court or the laws of this State."
2 264 Ill. 488, 106 N. E. 350 (1914).
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guardian of the minor in whose favor the award had been
made challenged the constitutionality of the section under
which such review was sought on the ground that the statute
purported to confer original jurisdiction upon the Supreme
Court in violation of Article VI, Section 2, of the state con-
stitution.' That contention was sustained and the provision
declared invalid for the reason that the legislature was with-
out power to enlarge the original jurisdiction of the court and
the writ in question was not sought "in aid of or to protect""
the appellate jurisdiction thereof. The recognized importance
of an early determination as to whether or not the parties to
an award were entitled to judicial review and, if so, under
what circumstances, led the court to make a careful examina-
tion of the controlling principles and to indicate that there
would be no doubt that the circuit courts could issue the com-
mon-law writ of certiorari otherwise the whole scheme for
workmen's compensation would be invalid.' The method
pursued, however, was held to be an improper one.
Following that decision, the legislature enacted the 1915
amendment to Section 19 so as to provide, for the first time,
for review of all questions of law presented by the record
before the circuit court on writ of certiorari.' That amend-
3 Ill. Const. 1870. Art. VI, § 2, declares: "The supreme court . . . shall have
original jurisdiction in cases relating to the revenue, in mandamu8 and habeas
corpu8 and appellate jurisdiction in all other cases."
4 264 Ill. 488 at 494, 106 N. E. 350 at 353.
5 In that regard, the court stated: "It seems clear the legislature would have
no power to deprive the parties of the right to have a court review the action of
the board to the extent of determining whether the board had acted illegally or
without jurisdiction. To deny a court review of those questions would violate the
due process of law provision of the Constitution. Where the parties voluntarily
elect to come within and be governed by the provisions of the act, it may well be
they waive any constitutional right to trial by jury . . . The industrial board
has no jurisdiction to apply the act to persons or corporations who are not subject
to its provisions nor to an accident not within the provisions of the act. If it did
so it would not be acting within its powers,' and it would seem essential that there
must be some remedy for a review by some proper court of the question whether
the board acted within its powers. No valid provision having been made in the
act for such review, it does not follow that none can be had. We have no doubt
the circuit courts have jurisdiction to issue the common-law writ of certiorari to
review the decisions of the board for the purpose of determining whether it had
jurisdiction or whether it had exceeded its powers and acted illegally . . . It may
also be that when application is made to the circuit court to have judgment entered
on the award that court would have power to inquire whether the board acted
within its powers, but whether it would or not, this question may be reviewed by
the circuit courts by the common-law writ of certiorari." See 264 Ill. 488 at 494-5,
106 N. E. 350 at 353.
a Laws 1915, p. 400 at 410.
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ment, like the earlier statute, made the decision of the com-
mission final unless reviewed in the manner provided, but
authorized review of questions of law in the circuit court by
either writ of certiorari or by suit in chancery. The decision
of the circuit court was declared to be subject to review only
by the Supreme Court upon writ of error which writ was to
issue automatically if the trial court certified that the case
was one that should be reviewed by the higher tribunal. The
Supreme Court, despite the absence of such certificate, was
empowered to grant a writ of error if it saw fit so to do. Such
writ, when issued, operated as a supersedeas.
Challenge of such amendment upon constitutional
grounds came quite early after its enactment for the case of
People ex rel. Munn v. McGoortfy7 was already in progress
when the statute was passed. The award there concerned
had been entered in March 1915, prior to the effective date of
the amendment, and the employer had promptly sought re-
course to a common-law writ of certiorari which, in August,
was quashed on motion of the claimant. The employer then
prayed an appeal from such ruling to the Appellate Court but
that prayer was denied by the trial court. A motion to vacate
the order denying leave to appeal was likewise denied. The
employer then sought an original writ of mandamus from the
Supreme Court to compel the respondent, judge of the circuit
court, to grant appeal on the theory that the certiorari pro-
ceeding was a common-law action on which appeal appropri-
ately lay to the Appellate Court in the absence of any question
which would require direct appeal to the Supreme Court.'
Application of the 1915 amendment to the case was ques-
tioned on constitutional grounds as violating the requirement
that all laws relating to courts should "be general, and of uni-
form operation, ' since it denied appeal to the Appellate Court
in proceedings arising under the Workmen's Compensation
Act but permitted such review in all matters arising before
other inferior tribunals. The court acknowledged that there
would be great force in the contention if any attempt was
made to discriminate between any of several common-law
7270 II. 610, 110 N. E. 791 (1915).
8 Hurd Rev. Stat. 1913, Ch. 37, § 25.
9 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI. § 29.
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writs of certiorari which might be issued to the various tri-
bunals, but concluded that the writ of certiorari permitted by
the 1915 amendment was a statutory rather than a common-
law writ," hence legislative regulation of review thereon was
permissible even to the extent of requiring that such review
be conducted in the Supreme Court." Comprehensive dis-
tinctions, therefore, exist between the common-law and the
statutory writ of certiorari.
Another interesting situation was presented in Suburban
Ice Company v. Industrial Board" where the decision of the
administrative tribunal, rendered before the 1915 amendment,
was affirmed on common-law certiorari sixteen days after
the amendment became operative. The employer, apparently
unaware of the change in the law, prayed for an appeal to the
Appellate Court, which prayer was granted. After the de-
cision in the McGoorty case, the employer voluntarily moved
to dismiss the appeal and, upon return of the record to the
trial. court, asked for vacation of the original order quashing
the writ of certiorari as not being in compliance with the
amended statute. Action as requested was taken by the trial
court although it still affirmed the decision of the board. On
writ of error to the Supreme Court from the last order, the
claimant urged that the trial court was without power to
vacate the original decision since the term had expired, hence
the writ of error had been issued improvidently. It was held,
however, that the change in the law while the case was in
progress was binding on the trial court so that no error had
occurred in vacating the first erroneous judgment and sub-
stituting, in lieu thereof, a judgment in conformity with the
amended statute. The effect of that holding, therefore, was
10 Although the proceeding had been begun by use of a common-law writ, the
Supreme Court found that the change in the statute prior to decision in the trial
court governed the situation on the ground that there was no vested right In any
particular remedy so that the case had to proceed as if the writ had been issued
subsequent thereto.
11 270 Ill. 610 at 618, 110 N. E. 791 at 794. Even after the decision In the
McGoorty case, appeals in workmen's compensation cases were heard in the Appel-
late Court In Schwartz v. Hartman Furn. & Carpet Co., 205 Ill. App. 330 (1917),
and Delscamp v. Hahnemann Hospital, 205 Ill. App. 498 (1917), reversed in 282
Ill. 316, 118 N. E. 767 (1918), although no consideration seems to have been given
to jurisdictional questions.
12 274 Ill. 630, 113 N. E. 979 (1916).
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to make the amendment apply retroactively to all cases then
pending.
JURISDICTION UNDER THE 1915 AMENDMENT
A. As to Questions of Fact
For many years the several circuit courts were limited,
upon review of the decisions of the Industrial Commission, to
the consideration solely of questions of law presented by the
record and had no power to examine questions of fact. That
limitation, even as applied to the Supreme Court, had been
written into the original statute13 and had been carried over
into the 1915 amendment as an express qualification on the
powers of the circuit courts. 4 Even when the matter reached
the Supreme Court on writ of error to the circuit court pur-
suant to the amended statute, the provision was construed so
as to confine the Supreme Court to questions of law only
although the grant of jurisdiction in that regard was not
expressly circumscribed. 5 It must be remembered, therefore,
that in all compensation cases passed upon by the Illinois
Supreme Court, prior to the 1921 amendment, as well in all
cases arising in the circuit courts during such period, the
courts were bound by the decisions of the Industrial Commis-
sion, if the same were supported by any legal evidence, in the
absence of any error of law.
As the findings of fact made by the Commission were con-
clusive if supported by competent legal evidence, it became
necessary for the courts, after 1915 and prior to 1921, to define
and establish a clear-cut dividing line between questions of
fact and questions of law. Such line was rather definitely
fixed by developments under the 1915 amendment which fur-
nish a background for subsequent procedural changes. A
clearer understanding of such changes and the decisions
13 Laws 1913, p. 349, § 19(f), stated: ". . . but the Supreme Court shall have
power to review questions of law involved in any such decision ....
14Laws 1915, p. 410, §19(f) (1).
15 Ibid. In that regard, the statute merely stated: "Judgments, orders and
decrees of the circuit court under this Act shall be reviewed only by the Supreme
Court upon writ of error." It is fundamental law that the common-law writ of
error was confined in scope to a review of legal errors appearing on the face of
the record: Anderson v. Steger, 173 Ill. 112, 50 N. E. 665 (1898).
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under later amendments requires a brief survey of the earlier
decisions as they relate to questions of fact.
At the start, the Supreme Court merely called attention
to the limitation upon its power to review by stating: "The
circuit court and this court are bound by the decision of the
Industrial Board if there is any legal evidence to support it."'
Such court also observed that it was not within the province
of the court to pass upon the weight or sufficiency of such evi-
dence so long as competent or legal evidence was found in the
record to support the decision of the board or commission. 7
The tenor of those remarks was reiterated in several other
cases except for the embellishment that the conclusive deter-
mination of the commission on questions of fact was subject
to the statutory proviso that there be no fraud present," and
that the evidence in the record "fairly. tends to prove that the
accident arose out of and in the course of the employment." 9
As if to re-emphasize the doctrine that the courts, on
certiorari or writ of error, were limited to reviewing questions
of law and could not pass on the weight of competent evidence
even though contradictory evidence was present, later de-
cisions used the significant word "repeatedly" in connection
with restatements of that doctrine," the court pointing out
that its repeated holdings prevented a change on its part even
though it might think change desirable. In more and more
cases, however, the employers sought to question the findings
of the commission on matters of fact thereby reflecting a gen-
eral dissatisfaction against the legislative limitations imposed
upon the courts by Section 19(f) of the statute. Such dissatis-
faction might never have arisen, in the judgment of many
persons, had there been more concern for public welfare than
16 Munn v. Industrial Board, 274 Ill. 70 at 76, 113 N. E. 110 at 113 (1916).
17 Chicago Dry Kiln Co. v. Industrial Board, 276 Ill. 556 at 562, 114 N. E. 1009 at
1011 (1917).
18 See, for example, Parker-Washington Co. v. Industrial Board, 274 Ill. 498 at
501, 113 N. U. 976 at 978 (1916) ; Victor Chemical Works v. Industrial Board, 274
Ill. 11 at 22, 113 N. E. 173 at 178 (1916).
19 Northern Illinois Light & Traction Co. v. Industrial Board, 279 Ill. 565 at 569,
117 N. E. 95 at 97 (1917).
20 Schwarm v. George Thomson & Sons Co., 281 Ill. 486 at 489, 118 N. E. 95 at
96 (1917) ; Swift & Co. v. Industrial Commission, 288 Ill. 132 at 136, 123 N. E. 267
at 268 (1919) ; O'Callaghan v. Industrial Commission, 290 Ill. 222 at 226, 124 N. E.
811 at 813 (1919).
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for partisan politics in the appointment of members to the
commission and had there been more intelligence displayed
and less prejudice and bias shown in the administration of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. It is a fair conclusion, drawn
from a study of the reported cases during the period while the
1915 amendment remained in effect, that the commission in
those early years unfortunately failed to accord to its work
the degree of sincerity and intelligence necessary to proper
administration of the wide powers granted to it.
The inability of the court, under the then existing legis-
lative limitations, to curb the spreading dissatisfaction over
the arbitrary findings of the commission was pointedly ex-
pressed by the Illinois Supreme Court in its opinions. In
McGarry v. Industrial Commission,2 for example, the court
declared:
There is much conflict in the evidence concerning the cause and extent
of Vail's disability. While we think a clear preponderance of the
evidence shows that the present condition of defendant in error is
due largely, if not entirely, to an organic disease, caused, in part at
least, by the habitual use of intoxicating liquors, we cannot disturb
the holding on this ground . . . It is the duty of the Industrial Com-
mission to consider all the evidence in a hearing of this kind, and to
render its decision in accordance with the preponderance of the evi-
dence. It should not grant an award merely because there is evidence
in the record which tends to support that award, nor should it specu-
late upon a possible state of facts which does not reasonably appear
to exist from the evidence. We have said with tiresome regularity
that we cannot weigh the evidence, but must confirm the decision of
the Industrial Commission if there is any competent evidence in the
record which justifies its finding.
2 2
Again, in Joseph Halsted Company v. Industrial Commis-
sion,21 it was urged that certain testimony before the commis-
sion was improbable and incredible and that, as a conse-
quence, the court should determine whether or not the
evidence as a whole fairly tended to support the finding. But
the court patiently remarked:
We have held many times that where there is legal evidence tending
to sustain the commission's finding its decision is conclusive. Whether
21290 Il. 577, 125 N. E. 318 (1919).
22 290 Ill. 577 at 578, 125 N. E. 318 at 319.
22 287 IU. 509, 122 N. E. 822 (1919).
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the commission has fallen into error or not in determining the weight
of evidence, its decision is not subject to review by the courts. No
mistake, however gross it may seem, in deciding upon the preponder-
ance of the evidence, can be corrected by the courts, for the reason
that no jurisdiction has been conferred upon the courts for that pur-
pose, but, on the contrary, that power has been expressly denied.
The testimony of a witness which is contrary to a known natural law
will be rejected, but the mere improbability of its truth or its repug-
nance to other evidence does not authorize us to say that the com-
mission should have disregarded it, when the Legislature has
conferred the power to decide that question upon the commission and
has denied it to us. The fact that there is some legal evidence sus-
taining the issue on the part of the claimant is not sufficient to justify
an award by the commission unless the greater weight of all the
evidence is in his favor, for the burden of proof is on the claimant,
and it is the duty of the commission to consider and weigh all the
evidence produced and decide according to its preponderance. The
court, however, can consider only the evidence favorable to the claim-
ant, and if the record contains evidence which fairly tends to support
his claim the finding in his favor is conclusive.2 4
Similar expressions might be quoted, but enough has been
said to show that the court was careful, during this period, to
observe the limitations placed upon it as to matters of fact
involved in the workmen's compensation proceeding.25
B. As to Questions of Law
The courts were not powerless, though, under the 1915
amendment to pass upon questions of law presented in the
records of the Industrial Commission. Even if not permitted
to weigh the evidence, they could determine, as a matter of
law, whether there was any legal evidence to support the com-
mission's decision and they indicated at quite an early date
that whether the evidence submitted was competent or not
was a question open to judicial investigation.26 If the finding
of the commission was based on hearsay or other improper
evidence, for example, it was held proper for the court, on
certiorari, to remand the proceeding,27 or to quash the
record.2" In like fashion, if the evidence showed that the
24 287 Ill. 509 at 511-2, 122 N. E. 822 at 823.
25 Such limitations were held not to violate the "due process" clause of the
federal constitution in Nega v. Chicago Rys. Co., 317 Ill. 482, 148 N. E. 250 (1925).
26 Victor Chemical Works v. Industrial Board, 274 Ill. 11, 113 N. E. 173 (1916).
27 Peabody Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 287 Ill. 407, 122 N. E. 843 (1919).
28 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Industrial Board, 274 Ill. 336, 113 N. E. 629 (1916).
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employee was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of
injury or death, so as not to be entitled to the benefits of the
state statute, the decision of the commission was a nullity for
lack of jurisdiction.29 Other jurisdictional questions growing
out of the evidence were also open for review by the courts.
In F. W. Hochspeier, Incorporated v. Industrial Board," for
example, wherein an employee of an undertaker was killed
while driving the employer's car on return from a funeral, it
was argued that the determination of the commission that
the employer was engaged in the busines of "carriage by
land,"'" hence within the scope of the act, was conclusive on
the court, but it was decided that the finding was not binding
because it went, as a matter of law, to the existence of juris-
diction. When the court concluded that the employer was
not engaged in a busines of the type named it set the award
aside.
The most frequently litigated question in compensation
cases is whether or not the accidental injury for which com-
pensation is sought arose out of and in the course of the em-
ployment. It was often argued that a finding by the commis-
sion that the injury did so arise, if based on competent
evidence in the record, was binding on the courts while the
1915 amendment continued in effect. That question was
settled in the landmark and oft-cited case of Eugene Dietzgen
Company v. Industrial Board 2 wherein the court pointed
out, on reversing a decision which had affirmed an award of
compensation, that while the findings of fact were conclusive,
yet "the legal conclusions ... based on such findings are sub-
ject to the supervision of this court. 33 As a consequence, if
it is clear upon the facts that as a legal conclusion an injury
is not "accidental" or does not arise in the course of employ-
ment, a contrary conclusion by the commission will not be
allowed to stand as the same amounts to an error of law.
29 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 288 Ill. 603, 124 N. E. 344 (1919).
20278 Ii. 523, 116 N. E. 121 (1917).
31 Laws 1915, p. 401, § 3(b).
32279 Ill. 11, 116 N. E. 684 (1917).
33 279 Il1. 11 at 22, 116 N. E. 684 at 688.
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In Stubbs v. Industrial Board,84 the commission awarded
compensation for disfigurement in an amount which, if con-
sidered alone, would have been excessive. When taken in
conjunction with other disabilities suffered, however, the
award was not improper in the judgment of the commission
and its holding was affirmed by the circuit court. The Work-
men's Compensation Act then, and now, provides that an
award for mere disfigurement is proper provided no other dis-
ability is suffered but if other specific injury occurs the maxi-
mum recovery shall be confined to that payable for the other
specific injury." It was held that the award was erroneous as
being based on a claim of disfigurement only and that the
administrative tribunal had acted contrary to law in consider-
ing "the other disabilities specified by the applicant" which,
though based on matters of fact, presented a question of law
subject to judicial review.
Undoubtedly, the question of whether or not the commis-
sion has jurisdiction of a particular application for compensa-
tion presents a question of law open, at all times, to review.
That rule, enunciated under the 1915 amendment,86 still
obtains in this state so that an attempt by the commission to
apply the statute to persons or corporations not subject to its
provisions or to an accident not covered thereby clearly pre-
sents a question of law which may be reviewed by the courts.3 7
C. Other Incidents
Before concluding consideration of the power of the
courts under the 1915 amendment, attention may well be
directed to an incidental development which led the Illinois
Supreme Court to reject a rule of evidence which had been
observed for many years. It was, without doubt, helped to
take that action by the fact that it was concluded by the find-
34 280 Ill. 208, 117 N. E. 419 (1917).
35 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 145(c).
86 Hahnemann Hospital v. Industrial Board, 282 Ill. 316, 118 N. E. 767 (1918);
Mede Bros. v. Industrial Commission, 285 Ill. 483, 121 N. E. 172 (1918) ; Paul v.
Industrial Commission, 288 Ill. 532, 123 N. E. 541 (1919) ; Ellsworth v. Industrial
Commission, 290 Ill. 514, 125 N. E. 246 (1919).
37 Chicago Circular Adv. Service v. Industrial Com'n, 332 Ill. 156, 163 N. E. 408
(1928).
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ings of fact drawn by the Industrial Commission provided the
same were based on competent legal evidence.
Since 1889, it had been regarded as proper to receive the
verdict of a coroner's jury into evidence in a civil suit, on
behalf of either party, for the purpose of providing prima facie
proof of some fact found by the coroner's jury and appearing
on the face of the verdict, so long as the same was pertinent
to a material issue in the civil suit." Such verdicts had been
used to prove suicide in suits on life insurance policies, 9 to
establish insanity in will contest cases,4" to verify that the
defendant's conduct in tort cases was wilful and wanton.4 or
even to disclose blamelessness in negligence cases.4"
So, too, in numerous workmen's compensation cases dur-
ing the period where death benefits were claimed, certified
copies of coroner's verdicts had been introduced in evidence.
The commission, as has been noted, was not required to weigh
or even to consider the preponderance of the evidence intro-
duced but, so far as judicial review was concerned, could
decide claims regardless of established rules just so long as the
decision had some support in competent evidence. Verdicts
of coroner's juries, being then admissible in civil suits, were
likewise admissible in compensation cases as prima facie evi-
dence not only of the cause of death but also to establish that
the deceased employee received his injury in the course of his
employment. Such verdicts, therefore, provided some compe-
tent evidence upon which the commission could base its find-
ings. The courts were powerless to reverse such findings no
matter how contrary the same might be to the manifest
weight of the evidence. Although in other types of civil cases
such verdicts, while admissible, were not conclusive, the effect
in workmen's compensation cases was to make the same abso-
lutely conclusive evidence for the courts could do nothing
38 Criticism of the doctrine was announced by Judge Bailey as early as 1887.
See Zacharias, "Joseph Meade Bailey, 1833-1895," 16 CHICAGO-KENT REvIEW 1, at
p. 15, and the opinion in U. S. Life Ins. Co. v. Kielgast, 26 Ill. App. 567 (1888).
The holding was reversed, however, in 129 Ill. 557, 22 N. E. 467 (1889).
39 United States Life Ins. Co. v. Kielgast, 129 Ill. 557, 22 N. E. 467 (1889).
40 Pyle v. Pyle, 158 Ill. 289, 41 N. E9. 999 (1895).
41 Foster v. Shepherd, 258 Ill. 164, 101 N. E. 4-11 (1913).
42Devine v. Brunswlck-Balke-Collender Co., 270 Ill. 504, 110 N. E. 780 (1915).
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except affirm the award. 3 In Morris & Company v. Industrial
Board,44 in fact, all of the evidence before the commission was
based on hearsay save for the certified copy of the coroner's
verdict, while all of the testimony at the inquest which pro-
duced that verdict was likewise based on hearsay, yet an
award therein had to be affirmed."
The first evidence of dissatisfaction with that result was
indicated in Peoria Cordage Company v. Industrial Board46
where the circuit court had affirmed an award based upon a
coroner's verdict which, in turn, rested wholly on incompe-
tent and hearsay testimony. The practice of basing awards
on such evidence had, by then, become so definitely estab-
lished that the circuit court refused to certify the case to the
Supreme Court. That court, however, granted a writ of error
and later reversed the judgment.4 Official announcement of
the change in the rule of evidence that permitted the introduc-
tion of coroner's verdicts in civil cases did not come, however,
until the decision in Spiegel's House Furnishing Company v.
Industrial Commission." There the court, after reviewing the
origin of the rule and the extent of its application, declared its
abandonment thereof by stating:
The decisions of this court prior to the Peoria Cordage Co. case have
been uniform in their holdings. The departure in that case from
those holdings resulted by reason of the conclusion of this court that
our former decisions were wrong in principle although uniform and
consistent with the views of the court therein announced. The court
is of the opinion that it should be no longer the policy of this State
43 Armour & Co. v. Industrial Board, 273 Ill. 590, 113 N. E. 138 (1916) ; Victor
Chemical Works v. Industrial Board, 274 Ill. 11, 113 N. E. 173 (1916) ; Ohio Build-
ing Safety Vault Co. v. Industrial Board, 277 Ill. 96, 115 N. E. 149 (1917).
44284 Ill. 67, 119 N. E. 944 (1918).
45 Cartwright, Dunn, and Cooke, JJ., dissented vigorously on the ground that for
the verdict of the coroner's jury to fix civil liability upon one not a party to the
proceeding before the coroner was to "condemn him unheard and to violate the
most elementary rules for the administration of justice between individuals." See
284 Ill. 67 at 76, 119 N. E. 944 at 948.
46 284 Ill. 90, 119 N. E. 996 (1918).
47 The opinions in the Morris & Co. case and in the Peoria Cordage Co. case bear
the same date. A petition for rehearing was granted in the latter case, however,
and on rehearing the dissenting judges in the Morris & Co. case succeeded in
obtaining a change of opinion so as to induce the court, by a vote of four to three,
to revise its original opinion. Justice Farmer, who wrote the opinion in the Morris
& Co. case, as well as Carter and Craig, JJ., dissented without opinion to the final
statement in the Peoria Cordage Co. case.
48 288 Ill. 422, 123 N. E. 606 (1919).
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and the holding of this court that a coroner's verdict or inquest should
be admissible as evidence in civil suits for the purpose of establishing
personal liability against any individual in cases where the death of
any person is charged or to establish a defense to such a suit, or for
the purpose of establishing other issues between private litigants of
the nature indicated in the cases just reviewed. Therefore all of the
foregoing cases, and all other cases of this court containing similar
holdings, are as to such holdings expressly overruled. We are moved
to do this for several reasons. A review of the above cases clearly
discloses that many of the cases, if not all of them, have been largely
controlled by the admission in evidence of the verdicts of the coro-
ner's jury, and in many of them such verdicts' have furnished the sole
evidence to establish liability. As a consequence of such practice
there has resulted in this State a race and scramble by litigants to
secure a favorable coroner's verdict that would influence or control in
case a civil suit should be brought to establish a claim by reason of
death . . . It cannot be questioned that as a result of such practice
the coroner's verdict in many cases has been, and will continue to be,
a mere trap or device for the purpose of catching the unwary in such
suits and that public interests intended to be served by coroner's
inquests may not be so well guarded as they otherwise would be.
No court, we believe, has gone farther than this court to maintain
the maxim or doctrine of stare decisis when the questions decided
affect the validity and control the construction of contracts or where
the rules announced have become rules of property. Rulings on the
admissibility of certain documents as evidence of the character here
considered, or mere questions of procedure, ought to be followed
unless they are manifestly wrong, but may, and should, be changed
when the ends of justice and the public good will be served.49
JURISDICTION UNDER 1921 AMENDMENT
A. Changes in Statute
Although some change was made in Section 19(f) of the
Workmen's Compensation Act in 1917, so as to require the
filing of a bond with the praecipe for writ of certiorari in case
review was sought of an award for the payment of money,"
and again in 1919 to change the name of the administrative
tribunal from Industrial Board to Industrial Commission,5 1
really significant changes regarding the jurisdiction of the
courts did not occur until 1921. By an amendment of that
49 288 Il1. 422 at 4'30-1 and 433, 123 N. E. 606 at 609-10.
5o Laws 1917, p. 502.
51 Laws 1919, p. 547.
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year two words, to-wit: "and fact," were added so as to make
the completed sentence read:
The Circuit Court of the county where any of the parties defendant
may be found shall by writ of certiorari to the industrial commission
have power to review all questions of law and fact presented by such
record: Provided, that no additional evidence shall be heard in the
Circuit Court, and the findings of fact made by the commission shall
not be set aside unless contrary to the manifest weight of the evi-
dence, except such as arise in a proceeding in which under para-
graph (b) of this section a decision of the arbitrator or committee of
arbitration has become the decision of the industrial commission.5 2
While the jurisdiction of the circuit court was greatly
enlarged by that change, there was one sharp curtailment, for
the provision which gave it the right to certify that the cause
was or was not one proper to be reviewed by the Supreme
Court was omitted. Formerly, a writ of error issued from the
Supreme Court upon the filing of a favorable certificate as a
matter of right,58 although the court was still free to grant the
writ on petition even against an adverse certification. Fol-
lowing the 1921 amendment, all writs of error became discre-
tionary and were granted only upon petition duly filed.5"
Express prohibition in the 1921 amendment purported to
direct that the findings of fact made by the commission should
not "be set aside unless contrary to the manifest weight of the
evidence." 5  That limitation was rejected, in Otis Elevator
Company v. Industrial Commission,6 as being an attempt to
pass a special statute regulating practice in courts of justice
in violation of the state constitution. 7 The court there stated:
Under that section it is plainly not within the power of the Legisla-
ture to select a class of cases and by a special act provide for them a
different rule of decision from that which is applicable in other cases.
It will not be presumed that the Legislature would not have amended
the statute so as to give a review on the law and facts without also
52 Laws 1921, p. 457-8.
5' Laws 1915, p. 410.
54 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 156 (f) (2), directs that judgments of the circuit
or city courts under the act shall be reviewed only by the Supreme Court "upon
a writ of error which the Supreme Court in its discretion may order to issue if
applied for within sixty days after the . . .judgment sought to be reviewed."
55 Laws 1921, p. 457.
56 302 Ill. 90, 134 N. E. 19 (1922).
57 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 22.
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transgressing the constitutional limitation by infringing on the
powers of the judiciary in the particular class of cases. The limita-
tion is in a proviso as an attempted qualification of the statute, and
not as a part of the substantive law. Whether the limitation states
the same rule adopted by courts in deciding upon questions of fact
or not is of no importance, because, whether it is or not, the legisla-
ture cannot give such direction. The statute giving a right to a
review of the law and facts is valid without the void limitation."s
In such fashion, the court was able to save the beneficial por-
tions of the 1921 amendment without being obliged to reject
the whole.
Although not so stated, the amendment was held to be
retroactive in operation so as to apply to all cases in which
review was sought after its enactment even though instituted
prior thereto.59
B. Scope of Jurisdiction
It should be noted, at the outset, that although the juris-
diction of the Illinois Supreme Court to review the decisions
of the several circuit courts upon certiorari to the Industrial
Commission is said to be by writ of error," it does not neces-
sarily follow that such court is confined solely to errors of
law. That court regarded the limitation under the 1915
amendment, which denied to the circuit courts the power to
pass on questions of fact, as applicable alike to the Supreme
Court when the case came before it on writ of error. When,
however, the inferior courts were given the power, by the 1921
amendment, to review questions of fact as well as of law, the
same prerogative 'was assumed to be possessed by the
Supreme Court even though no express grant to that effect
was made. It may be said, therefore, that both the circuit
courts and the Supreme Court possess identical jurisdiction,
. e. to pass upon all questions presented by the record, except
that the Supreme Court does not obtain that right until
review has been had by certiorari in the circuit court. It is
58 302 Ill. 90 at 95, 134 N. E. 19 at 21. Without the attempted legislative prohibi-
tion, the court has consistently held that it would not set aside the findings of
fact made by the commission unless manifestly against the weight of the evidence:
Marshall Field & Co. v. Industrial Commission, 305 Ill. 134, 137 N. E. 121 (1922).
59 Otis Elevator Co. v. Industrial Commission, 302 Ill. 90, 134 N. E. 19 (1922);
Keeler v. Industrial Commission, 302 Ill. 610, 135 N. E. 98 (1922).
80 111. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 156 (f) (2).
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true, though, that the higher court will not usually substitute
its judgment on the facts for that of the commission particu-
larly if the decision of the administrative tribunal has received
the endorsement of the circuit court." The statute, in this
regard, has not been changed since that amendment hence the
reported decisions from the time that amendment became
effective may be deemed applicable to any cases now or here-
after pending in the absence of any further amendment or the
even more remote possibility of a change in the court's views
as to established rules of law.
From those decisions there may be extracted a series of
rules or propositions which may have bearing on the scope of
appellate review possible in workmen's compensation cases
or upon which it might be possible to predict the likelihood of
a particular award being upset. The following list is not
intended to be comprehensive, and may be found expressed
in slightly varied form in other cases than those cited. The
list is, however, reasonably complete. Such principles are:
First: The Industrial Commission is an administrative body created
by legislative enactment for the purpose of administering the Work-
men's Compensation Act. It is not a court and has not the inherent
powers of courts. There are no intendments in favor of its juris-
diction. 6
2
Second: The rules respecting the admissibility' of evidence and the
burden of proof are the same in proceedings under the compensation
act as those that prevail in common-law actions for personal injury.
63
Third: It is incumbent upon the claimant to prove by direct and
positive evidence, or by evidence from which.the inference can be
fairly and reasonably drawn, that the accidental injury arose out of
and in the course of employment.
64
Fourth: The act does not intend that the employer who comes within
its provisions shall be an insurer of safety of his employees at all
times during the period of employment. 65
61 Fransen Const. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 384 Il. 616, 52 N. E. (2d) 241
(1944). But see American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Industrial Com'n, 353 Ill.
324, 187 N. E. 495 (1933).
62 Michelson v. Industrial Commission, 375 Ill. 462, 31 N. E. (2d) 940 (1941)
Trigg v. Industrial Commission, 364 Ill. 581, 5 N. E. (2d) 394 (1936).
63 Mehay v. Industrial Commission, 316 Ill. 97, 146 N. E. 494 (1925).
64 Boyer Chemical Laboratory Co. v. Industrial Com'n, 366 Ill. 635, 10 N. E. (2d)
389 (1937).
65 Illinois Country Club v. Industrial Commission, 387 Il1. 484, 56 N. E. (2d) 786
(1944) ; City of Chicago v. Industrial Commission, 376 Ill. 207, 33 N. E. (2d) 428
(1941).
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Fifth: The burden of proof is always on the applicant for compensa-
tion to prove by legally competent evidence the facts which establish
his claim, and the proof, whether by direct and positive or circum-
stantial evidence, must be such as by its preponderance justifies an
inference of liability without the necessity of a resort to speculation,
conjecture or surmise or a choice between two views equally com-
patible with the evidence.
66
Sixth: It is the duty of the commission to weigh the whole evidence,
and it is not justified in finding for one party merely because there
is some testimony which, standing undisputed, would justify the find-
ing, when the facts and circumstances in evidence preponderate in
favor of the opposite conclusion.
67
Seventh: The commission should weigh the evidence heard by it and
make its finding in favor of the party in whose favor the evidence
preponderates.65
Eighth: An award must be based upon facts in evidence and cannot
rest upon conjecture, speculation or surmise.69
Ninth: The Industrial Commission may act on reasonable inferences
arising from undisputed or established facts.
7 0
Tenth: Liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act may not
be based upon imagination, speculation or conjecture, but must have
a foundation of facts established by a preponderance of evidence, and
where such facts are not so established the judgment must be
reversed.7 1
Eleventh: It is the province of the commission to draw reasonable
conclusions and inferences from the evidence and neither the Supreme
Court nor the circuit courts may set aside such findings of fact unless
they are manifestly against the weight of the evidence.
7 2
Twelfth: It is the duty of the court to weigh and consider'the evi-
dence in the record, and if it is found that the decision of the com-
mission is without substantial foundation in the end, the award must
be set aside. 7
3
66 Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Industrial Commission, 352 Ill. 405, 186 N. E. 140
(1933).
67 Mirific Products Co. v. Industrial Commission, 356 Ill. 645, 191 N. . 203
(1934).
68 Camp Spring Mill Co. v. Industrial Commission, 302 Ill. 136, 134 N. E. 30
(1922).
69 Bauer & Black v. Industrial Commission, 322 Ill. 165, 152 N. E. 590 (1926).
70 Fransen Const. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 384 Il. 616, 52 N. E. (2d) 241
(1944).
71 Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 366 IlL 642, 10 N. E. (2d)
352 (1937).
72 DeBartolo v. Industrial Commission, 375 Ill. 103, 30 N. E. (2d) 677 (1940).
73 Inland Rubber Co. v. Industrial Commission, 309 Ill. 43, 140 N. E. 26 (1923).
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Thirteenth: Where the evidence is merely conflicting and the award
is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, the decision of
the commission will not be disturbed.7
4
Fourteenth: Where the facts are not in dispute, the question pre-
sented is one of law as to whether the facts support the award.
75
Fifteenth: Even though an award for compensation has been affirmed
by the circuit court, it will be reversed by the Supreme Court if not
supported by competent evidence.
76
There has been an almost obvious reluctance on the part
of the Supreme Court, however, since the 1921 amendment to
displace the judgment of the commission with its own judg-
ment as to questions of fact even though it is now the duty of
the courts to weigh and consider the evidence. Due weight
has been and is being given to the factual findings of the com-
mission at least in cases where that body has not been guilty
of obvious error. In Inland Rubber Company v. Industrial
Commission,77 for example, the court stated it would follow
such practice because the commission was "qualified by ex-
perience and special study to weigh facts applicable to cases
within its jurisdiction."7 8 That attitude was restated in Swift
& Company v. Industrial Commission,79 and in Carrion v.
Industrial Commission"° the court amplified the same by
adding:
The determination of questions of fact is a primary function of the
Industrial Commission . . . The arbitrator and the commission had
an opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to judge their
credibility. The courts will not interfere with a finding of fact made
by the Industrial Commission which is not clearly and manifestly
against the weight of the evidence . . .The arbitrator and the com-
mission found that the petitioner had failed to sustain the burden
of proving dependency upon the deceased. Under the rules an-
nounced, the circuit court was not justified in interfering with that
finding which, in this case, is not contrary to the manifest weight
of the evidence.8 1
74Weil-Kalter Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 376 Ill. 48, 32 N. E. (2d) 889
(1941).
75 Northwestern Yeast Co. v. Industrial Commission, 378 Ill. 195, 37 N. E. (2d)
806 (1941).
76 Sidney Wanzer & Sons, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 380 Ill. 409, 44 N. E.
(2d) 40 (1942).
77309 11. 43, 140 N. E. 26 (1923).
78 309 Ill. 43 at 49, 140 N. E. 26 at 28.
79 350 Ill. 413 at 418, 183 N. E. 476 at 478 (1932).
so 370 Ill. 474, 19 N. E. (2d) 329 (1939).
81370 Iil. 4,74 at 477, 19 N. E. (2d) 329 at 330.
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1. Province of Circuit Courts
Far back in this article the procedural details necessary to
get the record of the Industrial Commission before the circuit
court for review on writ of certiorari were discussed at
length. 2 The long detour which has occurred since then was
necessary in order to lay foundation for an understanding of
the origin and development of the powers and duties of such
courts. As presently constituted, the statute directs that such
power shall extend to a "review of all questions of law and
fact presented by such record.""3 The statute obviously does
not contemplate a trial de novo such as would be the case, for
example, on appeals from judgments rendered by justices of
the peace, 4 or from decisions of the county courts. 85 As a
consequence, the hearing on the writ of certiorari before the
circuit court is conducted much like an oral argument on an
ordinary appeal.
It is, of course, the duty of the circuit court to weigh the
evidence in the record so as to determine whether the findings
of the Industrial Commission are supported by legally compe-
tent evidence or are manifestly against the weight thereof,
and when so doing it should exercise "its own independent
judgment as to both law and facts according to the settled
rules governing judicial action and decision. 86  When so
doing, however, it may not go outside of the record, for addi-
tional evidence may not be received even by stipulation of the
parties."s In this connection, it may be well to note that the
1921 amendment expressly directed that "no additional evi-
dence shall be heard in the circuit court,"8 but that such lan-
guage was omitted at the time of its revision in 1933 and has
not reappeared since then. 9 Any inference that such repeal
82 See 23 CHICAGo-KENT LAw REvIEw 205 et seq.
83 Il. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 156 (f) (1).
84 North American Provision Co. v. Kinman, 288 11. App. 414, 6 N. E. (2d) 235
(1937). See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 38, § 128.
85 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 37, § 294.
86 Inland Rubber Co. v. Industrial Commission, 309 Ill. 43 at 48, 140 N. E. 26
at 28 (1923).
87 Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 303 Ill. 364, 135
N. E. 756 (1922).
88 Laws 1921, p. 457.
89 Laws 1933, p. 592. Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 156(f) (1), with
Cahill, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1931, Ch. 4'8, § 219 (f) (1).
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has made it possible for the court to entertain original evi-
dence would seem clearly negatived by the fact that the pres-
ent statute limits the review solely to questions "presented by
such record," hence the same would seem to operate as an
express statutory prohibition against the use of extrinsic
evidence.
After hearing has been granted in the fashion indicated,
the court is then empowered to "confirm or set aside the
decision of the industrial commission.""° No further direction
is given as to what should occur in the event the decision is
confirmed and none is necessary for the court's power is then
exhausted, but in case it is set aside the statute then directs:
"If the decision is set aside and the facts found in the proceed-
ings before the commission are sufficient, the court may enter
such decision as is justified by law, or may remand the cause
to the industrial commission for further proceedings and may
state the questions requiring further hearing, and give such
other instructions as may be proper."91
The duty of the circuit court, under the statute, seems to
be reasonably clear so there should be little ground for any
misunderstanding. A review of the cases taken to the Illinois
Supreme Court on writs of error, however, discloses that the
several circuit courts have frequently exceeded their authority
not alone on questions relating to the weight or competency
of evidence, or as to the fundamental jurisdiction of the com-
mission, but also over questions as to their own power in such
cases. The most common of such errors occurs in entering
judgment for the amount of the award and issuing execution
thereon,92 or in taxing costs against the unsuccessful peti-
90 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 156(f) (2).
91 Ibid.
92 Baum v. Industrial Commission, 288 Ill. 516, 123 N. E. 625, 6 A. L. R. 1242
.(1919). Laws 1919, p. 549, provided that: ". . . no judgment shall be entered in
the event the employer shall file, with the said commission its bond, with good and
sufficient surety in double the amount of the award, conditioned upon the payment
of said award in the event . . . the said decision, upon review, shall be affirmed,"
That provision was omitted in 1929, but prior thereto the provision for filing bond
on review with the circuit court had been incorporated in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943,
Ch. 48, § 156(f) (2), by Laws 1919, p. 548. The same reasons for making judgment
unnecessary still prevail: Nierman v. Industrial Commission, 329 Ill. 623, 161 N. E.
115 (1928). That issuance of execution is improper, see Otis Elevator Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 288 Ill. 396, 123 N. E. 600 (1919); 0. W. Rosenthal
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 290 Ill. 323, 125 N. E. 250 (1919); Tribune Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 290 Ill. 402, 125 N. E. 351 (1919).
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tioner,98 both of which acts are clearly in excess of the court's
authority. 4 Other errors arise in making lump-sum awards, 5
in attempting to retain jurisdiction of the case although at the
same time remanding it to the Industrial Commission for pur-
pose of taking additional evidence," by attempting to limit
the original jurisdiction of commission when reviewing an
arbitrator's award, 7 or by attempting to confer jurisdiction
on the commission through the use of mandamus.
When it is remembered that the authority of the several
circuit courts in workmen's compensation cases is purely
statutory, there is no question but what such courts, in
attempting to exercise jurisdiction beyond statutory limits,
clearly commit error although their acts, in other cases and
under other circumstances, would be perfectly proper. The
final decision of the circuit court when reviewing a compensa-
tion case, therefore, should be limited to (1) affirming the
findings and the award based thereon; (2) setting aside the
award and entering such decision as is justified by law; or (3)
remanding the cause to the commission for further proceed-
ings.99
2. Review before Supreme Court
One last step remains in the process of securing review of
an award in a workmen's compensation case, and that is to
procure consideration of the decision by the Illinois Supreme
Court. The pertinent statute states:
Judgments and orders of the Circuit or City Court under this Act
shall be reviewed only by the Supreme Court upon a writ of error
which the Supreme Court in its discretion may order to issue, if
93 J. E. Crowder Seed Co. v. Industrial Commission, 347 Ill. g6, 179 N. E. 518
(1932) ; American Car & Foundry Co. v. Industrial Commission, 335 Il1. 322, 167
N. E. 80 (1929).
04 It should be noted that while the court has express authority, under Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 156(g), to enter judgment on the award and also to tax the
costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee, against the employer, such provision
is confined to cases where the employer has (a) refused to pay compensation
awarded, and (b) has taken no steps to procure review pursuant to Section
156(f) (1).
95 Cobine v. Industrial Commission, 350 Ill. 384, 183 N. E. 220 (1932).
9) Kudla v. Industrial Commission, 336 I1. 279, 168 N. E. 298 (1929) ; Western
Shade Cloth Co. v. Industrial Commission, 325 Ill. 570, 156 N. E. 796 (1927).
97 Rodriguez v. Industrial Commission, 371 Ill. 590, 21 N. E. (2d) 741 (1939).
98 Cooke v. Industrial Commission, 340 Ill. 309, 172 N. E. 761 (1930).
99 111. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 156(f) (2).
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applied for within sixty days after the rendition of the Circuit or
City Court judgment or order sought to be reviewed. The writ of
error when issued shall operate as a supersedeas. 100
At one time, as has been pointed out, the circuit court was
permitted to certify whether or not, in its opinion, the cause
was one proper to be reviewed by the Supreme Court but that
court was not concluded by an adverse certificate. Since 1921,
the circuit court has been lacking the power to issue such a
certificate and the higher court has been vested with a discre-
tion to determine whether a writ of error should or should
not issue.
Before that discretion will be exercised, a petition for writ
of error must be filed with the higher court within the time
fixed by the statute, to-wit: sixty days after rendition of the
judgment or order sought to be reviewed, which petition
should comply with appropriate rules regulating the form
thereof.' 1 No new bond is necessary for, by express provi-
sion, the bond filed with the praecipe for the writ of certiorari
operates to stay the judgment or order of the inferior court
"until the time shall have passed within which an application
for a writ of error can be made, and until the Supreme Court
has acted upon the application for a writ of error, if such appli-
cation is made."' 0'  Should the petition be granted, the cause
proceeds in the same fashion as ordinary writs of error and
the parties may submit the same on the petition and answer
filed on the application for the writ, or either party may file a
further brief just as in cases of leave to appeal.'
Care should be taken, however, before filing such a peti-
tion, to insure that the judgment or order sought to be re-
viewed is a final one. The Supreme Court, in its interpreta-
tion of the statutory provision, has quite properly restricted
its jurisdiction to review only to cases where the order of the
inferior court satisfies the requirements of a "final judgment"
as that term is used in other situations. Mere interlocutory
100 Ibid.
101 Il. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 259.60.
102 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 156(f) (2).
103 That practice is not only sanctioned by rule but, at least in other types of
cases, has received approval of the court: People ex rel. Markee v. Barrett, 383
Ill. 207, 48 N. E. (2d) 928 (1943).
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orders, such as orders remanding the cause to the Industrial
Commission for the purpose of taking further testimony, are
not "final" and will not be reviewed by the Supreme Court on
writ of error,' °4 even though the parties consent thereto, for
"consent or acquiescence ... cannot confer jurisdiction of the
subject matter."' °
Even when the circuit courts had power to certify that
the cause was one proper for review by the Supreme Court, an
affirmative certificate to that effect was held insufficient to
confer jurisdiction over an interlocutory order despite the fact
that the same was, at least partly, in the form of a final order.
Thus, in Peabody Coal Company v. Industrial Commis-
sion, ' 6 the circuit court found that there was no competent
legal evidence of dependency to support the award so it
ordered that the record should be quashed but remanded the
cause to the commission for the purpose of taking additional
evidence. At the same time it gave a certificate to the effect
that, in its opinion, the cause was one in which review by the
Supreme Court was proper. Writ of error, issued upon such
certificate, was made the subject of a motion to quash by the
defendant in error. The writ was dismissed when the Supreme
Court found that the order was only an interlocutory one, and
pointed out that the certificate of the circuit court could not
confer a jurisdiction not otherwise possessed. Despite the
apparent finality of the order, the court drew important dis-
tinctions which should be observed by persons seeking review
by writ of error. It said:
An order of the circuit court quashing the entire record of an inferior
tribunal is a final judgment. The whole proceedings of the inferior
tribunal fall, and with them all incidental proceedings thereon ...
It is evident upon reading said written order, however, that the cir-
cuit court did not quash the entire record, but did so only insofar as
that record related to the matter of the evidence before the Industrial
Board which was treated in the stipulation as a deposition. The
order of that court directing the taking of further proceedings by
said board makes it evident that the court did not quash the entire
104Raffaelle v. Industrial Commission, 326 Ill. 166, 157 N. E. 206 (1927);
Thompson v. Industrial Commission, 377 Ill. 587, 37 N. E. (2d) 350 (1941).
'Or Dunaven v. Industrial Commission, 355 Ill. 444 at 446, 189 N. E. 283 at 284
(1934).
106 287 Il. 407, 122 N. E. 843 (1919).
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record, and the use of those terms in the written order is not con-
trolling, where it is evident from the entire order that something
else was intended. The order of the circuit court, in effect, sustained
the objection of the plaintiff in error to the competency of the evi-
dence offered and found there was no legal evidence of dependency.
The cause was thereupon in and by said order remanded for further
proceedings by said board. This was the only remanding order author-
ized by the statute
A judgment or decree is final and appealable only when it terminates
the litigation between the parties on the merits of the case, so that,
when affirmed, the court below has only to proceed with the execution
of the judgment or decree ...
As the order of the circuit court did not in any manner attempt to
fix the rights of the parties to said proceeding, it was not a final order,
and this court is without jurisdiction to review any other question.
10 7
Absence of protest by opposing counsel that jurisdiction
is lacking will not serve to induce the court to rule on pur-
ported errors for the Supreme Court is watchful of its juris-
diction and will act on its own motion by denying the petition
or dismissing the writ of error if one should be improvidently
issued."' 8 Action in dismissing such a writ does not, however,
operate to prevent an eventual review of the claimed error
when the question finally reaches the Supreme Court in a
proper fashion. In Thompson v. Industrial Commission,1°9
for example, the principal question was whether or not the
injured employee was engaged in interstate commerce. The
commission found that he was so engaged and denied com-
pensation but the circuit court, on certiorari, concluded other-
wise and remanded the cause with directions to determine the
nature and extent of liability. Writ of error was obtained
upon such order, which the Supreme Court properly held
should be dismissed as the order was clearly not a final one.
It said, in passing, that the right of the parties "to have the
question whether plaintiff in error [the employee] was under
the Workmen's Compensation Act or the Federal Employer's
Liability act reviewed by writ of error, if and when a final
judgment has been entered in this cause, is not affected by
this holding."'" 0
107 287 Il. 407 at 410-11, 122 N. E. 843 at 844-5.
108 Brown Shoe Co. v. Industrial Commission, 371 I1. 273, 20 N. E. (2d) 566
(1939).
109377 Ill. 587, 37 N. E. (2d) 350 (1941).
110 377 I1. 587 at 590, 37 N. E. (2d) 350 at 351.
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It is likewise clear that the Supreme Court is not bound
by the factual findings of the commission, made pursuant to
a remanding order entered by the circuit court on certiorari,
when the cause finally reaches the highest tribunal. Although
the administrative tribunal, as an inferior body, is bound to
comply with the directions of the circuit court made at the
time of remandment, the Supreme Court will later use its own
judgment in determining questions of law and fact presented
by the record. In Gray Knox Marble Company v. Industrial
Commission,"' the commission had decided, on appeal from
an award made by the arbitrator, that notice of the accident
had not been given within the time required so it set the
award aside. The circuit court, on certiorari, remanded with
directions to find that notice had been properly given. The
commission, pursuant to such direction, so found and its
award was confirmed when the case again came before the
-circuit court. Writ of error having been granted by the
Supreme Court, it was urged that such finding was conclusive.
The court, however, stated that while it would not disturb
findings of fact made by the commission unless manifestly
against the weight of the evidence, still it was not bound by
the directions of the circuit court and could "determine the
questions of law and fact according to our own judgment."
1 2
As the Supreme Court, on writ of error, sits not only for the
purpose of reviewing errors of the commission but also those
which may have been committed by the circuit court on
certiorari, it is manifestly proper that such court should not
be precluded by any direction of the circuit court whether
based on error of law or fact."'
Before concluding, attention is again directed to the fact
that the only method of securing review by the Supreme
Court in workmen's compensation cases is by writ of error;
that such writ is a discretionary one and is not granted as a
matter of course; and will issue, if at all, only on a proper
petition duly filed in apt time. Preparation of such petitions
111363 Ill. 210, 2 N. E. (2d) 60 (1936).
112363 Ill. 210 at 216, 2 N. E. (2d) 60 at 62.
113 Brown Shoe Co. v. Industrial Commission, 374 Ill. 500, 30 N. E. (2d) 4
(1940); Olympic Commissary Co. v. Industrial Commission, 371 Ill. 164, 20 N. E.
(2d) 86 (1939); Raffaelle v. Industrial Commission, 326 Ill. 166, 157 N. E. 206
(1927).
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requires as much or even greater care than would be devoted
to an appellate brief, for the mortality rate of such petitions,
unfortunately, is very high. While actual statistics are not
available, a guess could be hazarded that more than fifty per
cent. of such petitions are denied. Above all, the petition
should clearly disclose that the judgment or order on which
review is sought is, without question, a final one,"' for even
if the writ should, by chance, be granted it will later be dis-
missed without compunction if the order develops to be inter-
locutory in effect even though not so in form.
It has been impossible to treat all phases of appellate pro-
cedure in workmen's compensation cases as thoroughly as
might be desired. Enough has been said, however, to indicate
the tremendous scope and the technical complexities of this
intricate subject and, perhaps, to point the way toward some
urgently needed procedural reforms. If nothing else has been
accomplished, it is hoped that the idea that the administration
of compensation laws is a matter of the utmost simplicity has
been exploded. The impression has been created, not alone
in the minds of the public but also in those of many lawyers,
that compensation acts and the enforcement of rights there-
under represent a simple and relatively unimportant branch of
jurisprudence. Such is far from the actual case.
114 In Boston Store of Chicago v. Industrial Commission, 386 Il1. 17, 53 N. E. (2d)
455 (1944), the abstract of record, filed pursuant to writ of error granted, failed
to set forth the judgment of the circuit order or the nature of the decision of the
Industrial Commission. The Supreme Court refused to search the record and
dismissed the writ of error, saying: "Everything necessary to decide the ques-
tions raised must appear in the abstract."
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THE EX-SPOUSE AND SECTION 19
Legislative bodies have many times enacted laws which have
seemed, on the surface, to be clear and concise. When questions have
arisen as to the particular meaning of certain words or phrases used
therein, courts have been forced to interpret such terms in a manner
designed to give effect to the legislative intent. In so doing, they
have often provided definitions which, on the face of such statutes,
could scarcely be said to be encompassed within the terms used. By
so doing, courts have often laid themselves open to the accusation
that they were engaged in the process of legislating no matter how
much they concealed their attempts under the cloak of judicial in-
terpretation.
The Illinois Supreme Court, by its action in Classen v. Heath,1
seems to have likewise so exposed itself when it expanded the phrase
"surviving spouse" as used in Section 19 of the Probate Act 2 so as to
include a surviving divorced ex-spouse. The facts of that case show
that the defendant therein obtained a divorce from her husband in
1937 upon the ground of his desertion. At that time he owned two
parcels of real estate but no stipulation was entered into with regard
to the property rights of the parties. The ex-husband died in 1942
and his estate, including such realty, was duly probated. In 1944 the
plaintiff, as administrator de bonis non with the will annexed,$ filed
a petition to sell the two parcels of real property for the purpose of
paying the decedent's debts. The divorced wife was made a party
thereto. She claimed a dower right in the land, but such claim was
resisted on the ground that, by her failure to assert her dower in the
manner and within the time fixed by Section 19 of the act, she had
lost the right thereto. From an adverse decree, the ex-spouse appealed
directly to the Illinois Supreme Court as a freehold was involved.
That court, affirming the decree of the trial court, held the phrase
"surviving spouse" as used in the statute in question was broad enough
to apply to an ex-spouse so as to require the latter to act to claim
dower within the same time and in the same manner as would be
required of a widow or widower.
1389 Ill. 183, 58 N. E. (2d) 889 (1945).
2 11. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, § 171, provides: "The surviving spouse of a decedent
who dies after the effective date of this Act is barred of dower unless he perfects
his right thereto by filing during his lifetime at the time and place provided for
herein a written instrument describing the real estate, signed by the surviving
spouse and declaring his intention to take dower therein."
3 The will made no provision for the ex-spouse. Her failure to renounce would
not have been regarded as an acceptance of the provisions of the will in lieu of
dower since no choice was provided: Ward v. Ward, 134 Ill. 417, 25 N. E. 1012
(1890). The rule is different today, at least as to the surviving spouse, by reason
of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, § 172.
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No one can dispute the fact that, if the legislature has employed
language capable of two or more constructions, it is the duty of the
courts to resolve the ambiguity by ascertaining the legislative inten-
tion4 and applying the construction which renders the statute reason-
able rather than to adopt one which leads to absurd results.5 It is
likewise true, though, that in the absence of ambiguity there is no
occasion for construction of the statute hence the courts should apply
the same as written by the legislature. 6 There is scarcely room for
more than one construction for the term "spouse," for that term is
universally defined by the lexicographers as meaning a man or woman
who is "engaged or joined in wedlock,"'7 while the modifying adjec-
tive "surviving" connotes a spouse who outlives the other. It is only
when the prefix "ex-" is added to the word "spouse," so as to obtain
the meaning of a person who was "formerly but not now" a spouse,
that the legislative language could possibly be broad enough to apply
to the defendant in the Classen case. Despite this, the court concluded
that ambiguity was present which required construction.
From that point, the court progressed to the idea that it would
be an absurd result to grant tht ex-spouse a right of dower in the
divorced spouse's property in the absence of compliance with Section
19 while at the same time denying such right to the surviving wife
or husband. To adopt such view, the court indicated, would be fraught
,with mischievious consequences since titles might be clouded by
many dower claims in case the property owner, because of his or her
fault, was divorced more than once unless such potential clouds could
be removed within a reasonable time or were eliminated by suitable
adjustment at the time divorce was granted. The enormity of that
situation, together with the fact that to hold otherwise would result,
in the mind of the court, in giving the divorced spouse greater rights
than the surviving wife or husband, dictated a construction that the
legislature intended both to be within the comprehension of the statu-
tory provision. Had the legislature meant otherwise, the court said,
4 Moriarty, Inc. v. Murphy, 387 Ill. 119, 55 N. E. (2d) 281 (1944) ; People ex rel.
Shriver v. Frazier, 386 I1. 615, 55 N. E. (2d) 159 (1944).
5 Moweaqua Coal Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 360 Ill. 194, 195 N. E. 607
(1935).
6 People v. Lund, 382 Ill. 213, 46 N. E. (2d) 929 (1943). To determine whether
there is ambiguity, according to Trustees of Schools v. Berryman, 325 Ill. 72 at 76,
155 N. E. 850 at 851 (1927), the language used "should be given its ordinary
meaning."
7 Webster's New Int. Dict. See also Ballentine, Law Dict., p. 1225; 58 C. J.,
Spouse, p. 1307; Oxford Eng. Dict. on Hist. Principles, Vol. IX, p. 674. Cent. Dict.
and Encyclo., Vol. IX, p. 5859, gives as a variant: "A married person, husband
or wife; either one of a married pair." In Rossell v. State Industrial Accident
Commission, 164 Ore. 173, 95 P. (2d) 726 (1939), it was stated that the legal, as
well as the ordinary meaning of spouse is "one's wife or husband," hence a "sur-
viving spouse" must be the one, of a married pair, who outlives the other.
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it would no doubt have used "appropriate language" to express such
intent," hence the conclusion reached appeared inevitable.
The clarification of titles to land is, undoubtedly, a matter of
serious concern and one worthy of every attention. The inherent fear
indicated by the court that a parcel of land might, for a period of
time, be encumbered by a series of dower estates, brought about by
the tendency of certain modern humans to engage in "licensed po-
lygamy," is not unwarranted. But there is scarcely justification for
such a decision either in precedent 9 or logic and had more thought
been given to underlying principles the fallacies inherent therein
might have been recognized. The question goes much deeper than
one as to the manner of splitting hairs over the meaning of words.
It really grows out of the many changes made, in recent years, in an
endeavor to provide a suitable substitute for the common-law right
of dower.
That common-law right gave to the widow, upon her husband's
death, an interest in one-third of the lands and tenements of which
he was seized in fee simple or fee tail for the remainder of her life. 10
It was a right of such antiquity that its origin is difficult to trace, but
in this country, except where changed by statute, it remains the same
or substantially the same as at common law. The husband, on the
other hand, obtained no such right in his wife's property although he
did receive something comparable thereto. With the enactment of the
Married Women's Acts, it was felt that there was no just basis for
discriminating between the spouses, so the husband's estate of curtesy
s The courts developed and applied the maxim eopressio uniu8 e8t ezclusio
alterius to fit such situations: People ex rel. Hansen v. Collins, 351 Ill. 551, 184 N. E.
641 (1933). In the light thereof, it is hardly to be expected that the legislature,
when using the term "spouse," would be expected to add "and we don't mean 'ex-
spouse' !"
9 In Wait v. Wait, 4 N. Y. 95 (1850), a woman who had obtained an absolute
divorce on the ground of her husband's adultery was allowed a dower right in his
property such as was given to the "widow" by statute on the ground that there
was no just basis for denying the same to the innocent spouse although the stat-
ute expressly denied such right to a guilty one. The court said, at p. 107, that
whether or not a woman divorced from her husband, upon his subsequent death,
was to be called his "widow" might "furnish a curious question in philology," but
concluded that the language used was sufficient to describe the person intended.
In a later case, People v. Faber, 92 N. Y. 1460, 44 Am. Rep. 357 (1883), the court
indicated that the New York legislature sometimes used the terms "husband" and
"wife" to refer to persons actually divorced. In Illinois, however, as was noted
by the court in the instant case, the phrase "husband or wife surviving," used in
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 52, § 2, dealing with homestead rights, has been held not
to apply to divorced persons: Krusemark v. Stroh, 385 Ill. 64, 52 N. E. (2d) 156
(1944) ; Claussen v. Claussen, 279 Ill. 99, 116 N. E. 693 (1917); Stahl v. Stahl,
114 Ill. 375, 2 N. E. 160 (1885). So, too, in Indiana, the surviving ex-spouse has
been denied the right to a statutory share in the estate of the deceased property
owner on the ground that she was neither "widow" nor "surviving wife" within
the contemplation thereof: Fletcher v. Monroe, 145 Ind. 56, 43 N. E. 1053 (196).
10 Stribling v. Ross, 16 Ill. 121 (1854). See also Tiffany, Real Property, 3d ed.,
§ 487; Kent, Comm., IV, *35; Blackstone, Comm., II, 129.
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was abolished'1 and each spouse was given a like estate, denominated
"dower," in the other's property. That estate, which might be desig-
nated as statutory dower, was still only a life estate and of uncertain
value until still later statutory modifications resulted in treating the
surviving spouse as an heir and entitled to an interest in the fee.
12
The statutory estate thus created, however, was given to the surviving
spouse only after the debts of the deceased spouse had been paid so
the legislature saw fit to perpetuate the estate of dower, with its
freedom from claims of creditors, in case the surviving spouse pre-
ferred to receive it in lieu of the statutory estate of inheritance.
There being a choice open to the surviving spouse, it was not unrea-
sonable to force an election between the two types of estates. That
was the evident purpose of the legislature in enacting Section 19 of
the Probate Act for through it the surviving spouse is forced to take
the statutory estate of inheritance with its attendant consequences
unless he or she takes affirmative action to obtain the common-law
interest.
There is a vast difference, however, between compelling an elec-
tion among two or more beneficial interests on the one hand, as in the
case of the surviving spouse, and the situation presented in cases
where the parties were once married but were subsequently divorced.
As dower originally arose out of the marital relationship and required
a legally recognized ceremony for its existence, it naturally disap-
peared upon an absolute divorce.'2 Such would be the rule today but
for the fact that the legislature has provided by another section of
the Probate Act that a spouse who is divorced for the fault of the
other does not forfeit the right of dower which grew out of the
marriage which once existed.' 4 The "dower" there referred to is the
ancient common-law estate and is not a privilege to take an interest
in the fee. The innocent ex-spouse is not made an heir thereby but,
on the other hand, is not entirely penalized because the marriage has
failed. True such right is inchoate while the former spouses both
live. It is a mere expectation of property and may be changed, modi-
11 R. S. 1874, p. 423, § 1. The same idea is expressed in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch.
3, § 170.
12 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, § 162.
is Co. Litt., Liber II, Ch. XIX, *33b, states: "But if they were divorced a vinculo
matrimonii in the life of her husband, she loseth her dower." See also Vernier,
American Family Laws, Vol. II, p. 215. Provision in lieu of dower is destroyed
by divorce for the fault of the wife according to Jordan v. Clark, 81 Il. 465 (1876),
but not if the decree is obtained by her: Seuss v. Schukat, 358 I1. 27, 192 N. E.
668, 95 A. L. R. 1461 (1934). The same rule applied to the husband's estate of
curtesy: Howey v. Goings, 13 Ill. 95 (1851).
14 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, § 173. That statute has its origin In R. L. 1827,
p. 185.
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fled, or abolished by legislative action at any time. 15 It may be regu-
lated by law, and will be governed by the law in force at the time of
the death of the property owner. 16 The defendant in the instant case
had procured her divorce in 1937, but between the date of the decree
and the death of the husband, the legislature had enacted Section 19
of the Probate Act. Undoubtedly, if such statute applied to the de-
fendant, she would have to comply with its provisions respecting the
filing of a claim for dower within the period allotted. But wherein
would lie the sense of compelling the innocent divorced spouse to
make a choice such as is contemplated by that section when there
are no alternatives to choose between?
If the legislature wished to prevent the ex-spouse, no matter how
innocent, from claiming dower at all, then the thing to do was not to
enact Section 19 of the Probate Act but rather to repeal Section 21
from which that right stems. If any qualification ought to be placed
thereon, it should be done by modifying that section rather than by
misappropriating the sense of another provision having no real rela-
tion thereto. It well may be that, for the safety of titles, the ex-
spouse who is entitled to claim dower should be barred from the same
unless the right thereto is asserted in a positive and prompt manner.
That, however, as the courts have often said, is an "argument to be
addressed to the legislature." That objective could be simply and
quickly attained if the legislature felt it was a desirable one. Its
accomplishment in the manner laid down by the Illinois Supreme
Court in the Classen case, though, is neither sound nor sensible.
H. H. FLENTYE
A YEAR OF S. E. U. A.
The decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association' has been generally recognized as the most important
opinion handed down by the United States Supreme Court during
its 1943-4 term.2 One can well agree that such decision has far-
reaching consequences for it upset a constitutional law doctrine of
seventy-five years' standing,3 has required legislative attention by
every state in the Union, has produced Congressional action, and in
1 Sutherland v. Sutherland, 69 Ill. 481 (1873); Kauffman v. Peacock, 115 Ill.
212, 3 N. E. 749 (1885) ; Virgin v. Virgin, 189 Ill. 144, 59 N. E. 596 (1901) ; Mettler
v. Warner, 243 Ill. 600, 90 N. E. 1099, 134 Am. St. Rep. 388 (1910); Bennett V.
Bennett, 318 Il. 193, 149 N. E. 292 (1925) ; Kilgore v. Kilgore, 319 Ill. 298, 149
N. E. 754 (1925) ; Steinhagen v. Trull, 320 Ill. 382, 151 N. E. 250 (1926) ; Mitchell
v. Mitchell, 328 Ill. 136, 159 N. E. 274 (1927).
16 Dial v. Dial, 378 Ill. 276, 38 N. E. (2d) 43 (1941).
1322 U. S. 533, 64 S. Ct. 1162, 88 L. Ed. 1440 (1944). A related issue is treated
in Polish Nat. Alliance, etc. v. National Labor Rel. Board, 322 U. S. 643, 64 S. Ct.
1196, 88 L. Ed. 1509 (1944).
2 "Supreme Court, 1943-4 A Significant Term" (The Bureau of Nat. Affairs, Inc.)
p. 18.
' Paul v. Virginia, 75 U. S. 168, 19 L. Ed. 357 (1869).
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general has left the insurance business as a whole in an unsettled state
of affairs. In the light thereof, a survey of some of the specific effects
of the decision, one year after its pronouncement, may be warranted.
. So far as the case itself is concerned, the federal grand jury for
the Northern District of Georgia indicted the South-Eastern Under-
writers Association upon a charge of violating the Sherman Anti-
trust Act. 4 That association was composed of two hundred private
stock fire insurance companies and twenty-seven officers. The indict-
ment alleged that the association fixed premium rates and agent's
commissions, employed various types of coercion to force non-member
companies into the conspiracy, and attempted to compel those seeking
insurance to buy from the association members only. The government
contended that the Sherman Act was violated by such conduct as the
same amounted to a restraint of interstate trade and commerce and
also created a monopoly in at least six of the states. The association
demurred on the ground that the fire insurance business was not, and
never had been, commerce. That demurrer was sustained by the dis-
trict court upon the ground advanced. 5 A writ of error was granted
to the prosecution by the United States Supreme Court.6 Some thirty-
five of the states filed briefs as amici curiae seeking affirmance of the
lower court decision, but the Supreme Court, by a four-to-three deci-
sion,7 reversed the trial court and held that the business of insurance
is a form of commerce and, when conducted across state lines, is the
proper subject of federal regulation.8
By such decision, the nation's largest business was rendered sub-
ject to federal jurisdiction although the regulation thereof had
hitherto been handled by the states. The implications of numerous
decisions, beginning with Paul v. Virginia,9 were necessarily over-
4 15 U. S. C. A. § 1 declares: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." Section 2 thereof
states: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor."
5 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 51 F. Supp. 712 (1943).
6 Authority for such action, in criminal cases, is to be found in 18 U. S. C. A.
§ 682.
7 Justices Roberts and Reed did not participate in the decision of the case.
8 Mr. Justice Black wrote the majority opinion, concurred in by Justices Douglas,
Murphy and Rutledge.
9 75 U. S. 168, 19 L. Ed. 357 (1869). The principles thereof were applied in
Ducat v. Chicago, 77 U. S. 4'10, 19 L. Ed. 972 (1871) ; Liverpool & London Life &
Fire Ins. Co. v. Oliver, 77 U. S. 566, 19 L. Ed. 1029 (1871) ; Fire Association of
Philadelphia v. New York, 119 U. S. 110, 7 S. Ct. 108, 30 L. Ed. 342 (1886) ; Hooper
v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 15 S. Ct. 207, 39 L. Ed. 297 (1895) ; Noble v. Mitchell,
164 U. S.. 367, 17 S. Ct. 110, 41 L. Ed. 472 (1896); Nutting v. Massachusetts, 183
U. S. 553, 22 S. Ct. 239, 46 L. Ed. 324 (1902) ; Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Wisconsin, 247 U. S. 132, 38 S. Ct. 444, 62 L. Ed. 1025 (1918); Bothwell v.
Buckbee-Mears Co., 274 U. S. 274, 48 S. Ct. 124!, 72 L. Ed. 277 (1927) ; Colgate v.
Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 56 S. Ct. 252, 80 L. Ed. 299 (1935).
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ruled although not specifically rejected. In that regard, one factor
should be noted and that is that such earlier decisions had all involved
the validity of state statutes. The court may have felt that it did not
wish to invalidate such statutes inasmuch as Congress had fashioned
no regulation for the insurance business. To deny validity to such
statutes in retrospect would have given insurance companies, conduct-
ing a business inherently affected with a public interest, a free hand
to do as they pleased. Such prior opinions, moreover, were based on
the doctrine that each state could decide just what qualifications a
foreign company must meet in order to do business within the state,
for while corporations were "persons" under the due-process clause
they were not "citizens" within the privileges and immunities clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. That doctrine, doubtless, the court
did not wish to overthrow., The instant case, though, does constitute
the first wherein the United States Supreme Court was asked to rule
on the insurance business as it might be affected by an act of Con-
gress, and the majority opinion has now made such business subject to
federal regulation whereas the states, prior thereto, had regulated it
exclusively.
What, then, did the decision do to the insurance business? It was,
apparently, placed in a sort of no-man's land subject to attack from
both fronts. If it continued to abide by state regulations, it was open
to attack for such regulations, in many cases, could be said to tend in
the direction of a monopoly of trade so as to burden the free flow of
commerce. On the other hand, companies doing business in foreign
states might refuse to comply with all forms of state regulation on
the ground that they were subject only to federal control.10 Prac-
tical considerations regarding the uncertain status of the insurance
business with respect to regulation may have been the basic reason
for the strong dissents written by Justices Stone, Frankfurter and
Jackson.
Chief Justice Stone, one of the dissenters, although admitting
that Congress could regulate many aspects of the insurance business,
forecast that the effect of the decision would be to take away from
the states and to confer on the federal government the regulation of
a business already well-regulated under state laws and subject it to
the uncertainties of Congressional action. Justice Jackson, agreeing
that the conduct of insurance business across state lines actually
amounts to interstate commerce, nevertheless advanced the theory
that a fiction had been established to the effect that insurance should
lo See Keehn v. Hi-Grade Coal & Fuel Co., 23 N. J. Misc. 102, 41 A. (2d) 525
(1945), where it was argued that the S. E. U. A. decision had rendered Invalid
certain provisions of the New Jersey insurance law, but the same were upheld an
not amounting to a violation of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution.
Other aspects of the situation are dealt with in Brown v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 53
N. Y. S. (2d) 760 (1945), and McCarthy v. American Surety Co., 52 N. Y. S. (2d)
601, 183 Misc. 983 (1944).
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not be considered as ordinary commerce. In his desire to maintain
that theory so as to avoid the practical consequences of the decision,
Mr. Justice Jackson declared: "The states began nearly a century
ago to regulate insurance, and state regulation, while no doubt of
uneven quality, today is a successful going'concern. Several of the
states, where the greatest volume of business is transacted, have
rigorous and enlightened legislation, with enforcement and super-
vision in the hands of experienced and competent officials. Such state
departments, through trial and error, have accumulated that body of
institutional experience and wisdom so indispensable to good admin-
istration. The Court's decision at very least will require an extensive
overhauling of state legislation relating to taxation and supervision.
The whole legal basis will have to be reconsidered. What will be
irretrievably lost and what may be salvaged no one now can say,
and it will take a generation of litigation to determine. Certainly the
states lose very important controls and very considerable revenues."'"
Justice Frankfurter also expressed agreement with his dissenting
brethren, for he too did not want to ". . . wipe out elaborate and long-
established state systems for regulating and taxing insurance com-
panies."12
As could be anticipated from a reading of the dissenting opinions,
the decision was not generally well received either in the insurance
field or in the public press. One editorial stated that "Insurance D
Day fell just a few hours before Eisenhower's D Day . . . the mental
commotion of insurance men was pitiable, as their attention was torn
between invasion headlines and their efforts to apprehend the conse-
quences of the epochal, adverse U. S. Supreme Court decision . . .
Decisions upon which the whole system of state supervision of insur-
ance has been founded and under which the business has operated
apparently are juridical museum pieces."' 3  The Insurance Commis-
sioner for Massachusetts' 4 likewise expressed the sentiment of state
insurance officials when he commented that "a discussion of the
decision . . . should be periodically revised as the mischief which
flows from [it] manifests itself from time to time . . . If Mr. Justice
Black and his associates could have seen their way clear to accept
Mr. Justice Jackson's view, insurance supervisory officials and insur-
ance executives would have been spared much grief and the public
would have been saved the increased cost of insurance which flows
from costly litigation."'15
11 322 U. S. 533 at 590, 64 S. Ct. 1162 at 1192, 88 L. Ed. 1440 at 1478.
12 Charles Stuart Lyon, "Old Statutes and New Constitution," 44 ol. L. Rev. 599
at 634 (1944).
13 The Nat. Underwriter, Life Ins. Ed., June 9, 1944, p. 1.
14 Charles F. J. Harrington, past president (1943-4) of the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners and chairman of its Federal Legislation Committee.
15 Harrington, "An Exploration of the Effects of the S. E. U. A. Decision," 261
Ins. L. J. 590 at 590-1 (1944).
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Although such comments came from those primarily interested
in the insurance business, many constitutional lawyers of note were
of the same frame of mind. Professor Powell, as if speaking for them,
attacked the majority opinion with fine astuteness. After deducing
that Mr. Justice Black's decision was based on the major premise
that most people would hold insurance to be a form of trade and
commerce, he pointed out that it was "a little less than shocking to
have a Justice of the Supreme Court invoke the mere supposition of
common knowledge among lesser breeds without the law as worthy
of consideration against the conclusion of a district court which
preferred to respect its obligation to be faithful to superior con-
trolling precedents rather than to traduce them by resort to vaguely
indicated ancient locutions and to unspecified contemporary supposed
common knowledge of supposed most persons."'16
There were those, however, who approved. Hugh Evader Willis,
long an advocate of the belief that insurance is interstate commerce
and a severe critic of Paul v. Virginia, rejoiced in the decision and
stated that: "The present United States Supreme Court has overruled
another prior Supreme Court decision . . . and in doing so has done a
fine piece of work.'
17
The S. E. U. A. decision brought forth a volley of comments pro
and con, mostly con, which indicated the seriousness of the situation
created thereby. Meanwhile, what about the subject of all this dis-
cussion? What was the insurance business doing to remove itself
from the horns of the dilemma? Action was obviously necessary to
clarify the status of ,the business and it was not long before action
made its appearance. The general set-up became apparent almost im-
mediately. The fire and casualty companies indicated they would work
with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners in an at-
tempt to persuade Congress to take action granting relief from the
effects of the decision. A few days after the decision had been
handed down, several hundred representatives of the insurance busi-
ness met in Chicago to discuss the new situation. They recommended
that a special committee should consult all interested persons, should
hold executive sessions as well as public hearings throughout the
country, and should submit specific recommendations to the executive
committee of that association before September 1st. Life insurance
companies, on the other hand, appeared to remain aloof, probably on
the ground that they had nothing to fear from antitrust regulations.
Even before the decision had been announced, duplicate bills had
been introduced in the Senate and the House of Representatives on
September 20, 1943, designed to exempt insurance from the operation
16 See Powell, "Insurance as Commerce," 57 Harv. L. Rev. 937 at 988 (1944).
17 Willis, "United States of America v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association,"
258 Ins. L. J. 390 (1944).
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of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.18 These measures had been dis-
cussed in committee and representatives of the various insurance
interests had been heard, but the popular impression was that the
administration was holding up serious consideration. The S. E. U. A.
decision brought action, however, and the Walter-Hancock bill was
passed in the House by a vote of 283 to 54. The Senate bill, dis-
cussed in committee and before the insurance subcommittee during
the same week, was not reported out, no doubt because of the an-
nouncement by the Attorney General that neither he nor the Depart-
ment of Justice were considering action against the insurance busi-
ness until both the states and Congress had had an opportunity to
take appropriate action.' 9 At that time, Congress recessed and it
appeared certain that Senate action, either on its own or the House
bill, would not be taken until after election.
Beginning in July, 1944, the federal legislation committee of the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners conducted meetings
with the committees chosen by the varied insurance interests. 20 All
interested organizations or persons were invited to make suggestions,
and recommendations agreed upon by that committee were to be sub-
mitted to the executive committee of the N. A. I. C. for consideration.
The programs offered were many and varied. Predominant, however,
was the idea that in lieu of pressure for the passage of the Senate
Bailey-Van Nuys bill, passage thereof becoming less likely every day,
there should be substituted a plan for a moratorium on the application
of federal statutes regulating interstate commerce as applied to the
insurance business. In particular, the Sherman and Clayton acts, the
Federal Trade Commission act, and the Robinson-Patman acts were
to be suspended, for the time being, as they might relate to insurance
matters. The suggestion particularly appealed to the life insurance
interests and was one on which they found a common ground with
the others for the president of one of the larger life insurance com-
panies asserted that his company's sole concern was only over the
possible application of the Federal Trade Commission Act.21 Concern
over jthe possibility that that Commission, possessed of a seemingly
unlimited power to enter any field and say what is unfair competition
and what is a deceptive act or practice, might undertake to test insur-
ance practices can well be understood.
is S. 1362 is frequently referred to as the Bailey-Van Nuys bill, while H. &L 3270
has been designated the Walter-Hancock bill.
19 90 Cong., Rec., June 23, 1944, p. 6694. The statement of thp Attorney General
appears in the appendix to that issue at pp. A3632-3.
2o As, for example, the Association of Life Insurance Presidents, Insurance Exec-
utives Association, Eastern Underwriters Association, Association of Casualty and
Surety Executives, National Bureau of Casualty and Surety Underwriters, and
others.
21 See statement by Leroy A. Lincoln, president of Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., In
The Nat. Underwriter, Life Ins. Ed., Aug. 25, 1944, p. 2.
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Following such meetings, the executive committee of the
N. A. I. C. adopted four of the recommendations of its legislation
committee. Those recommendations called for (1) a declaration by
Congress that the regulation and taxation of the insurance business
should continue in the several states; (2) the complete elimination
of the insurance business from the scope of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act; (3) the total elimination thereof from the operation of
the Robinson-Patman Act; and (4) the partial elimination of re-
straints imposed by the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 22 That body also
directed its legislation committee to work with representatives of the
industry in sponsoring federal legislation.
Shortly thereafter, the Bailey-Van Nuys bill was given favorable
recommendation by the Senate judiciary committee and was submitted
to the Senate, but as a recess was about due it was uncertain as to
just when the bill would receive consideration. A minority report
of the judiciary committee contained a motion by Senator O'Mahoney
requesting that no action be taken until after the September meeting
of the insurance commissioners. Senator O'Mahoney there stressed
the fact that the Bailey-Van Nuys bill, while it would exempt the
insurance business from the antitrust laws, would not relieve the
industry from the operation of other federal statutes which were like-
wise based on the commerce clause. He urged, instead, that the state
commissioners' recommendations be made the basis for legislation.23
State officials and insurance concerns, fire and casualty companies
in particular, had been hoping that a rehearing in the Supreme Court
would prove more favorable to their cause than the original decision.
Such hopes were blasted, however, when the United States Supreme
Court, on October 9, 1944, denied the petition for rehearing. For a
while, some hope was fastened on the idea of a constitutional amend-
ment by which the insurance business might be declared exempt from
the effect of the commerce clause. For all practical purposes, though,
any solution of the problem would have to come from Congress in
whose lap the matter now rested.
Meanwhile, the legislation committee of the N. A. I. C. met again
in early November and drafted a proposed statute similar to the one
it had recommended earlier but with an additional provision calling
for a moratorium, until July 1, 1948, on the Sherman and Clayton
anti-trust laws except as the same related to coercion and boycotts.
It was planned, thereby, to give the states an opportunity to make
whatever changes might be necessary in the light of the S. E. U. A.
decision. That draft was drawn with comparatively little opposition
22 John M. McFall, "A Calendar of the 'S. E. U. A.' Case," 265 Ins. L. J. 72 at
73 (1945).
23 As reported in The Nat. Underwriter, Life Ins. Ed., Sept. 22, 1944, p. 1.
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and was approved at the midyear meeting held on December 4, 1944,
between the representative insurance and state associations.
24
The Senate had remained quiescent in the matter from the time
when the Bailey-Van Nuys bill had been reported out of the judiciary
committee, perhaps for the reason that all insurance interests had not
agreed on a legislative proposal by which the industry might be
governed. 2 5 The companies and the insurance commissioners realized
that a united front was necessary if they were to convince the Senate
of the appropriateness of their recommendations and they strove to
provide one. By December 13th all insurance interests agreed that
the proposed legislation should stand except that a portion of it,
exempting application of the Sherman Act after the moratorium,
should be deleted. Senators McCarron and Ferguson introduced this
amended proposal as a substitute for the Bailey-Van Nuys bill three
days later.26 At the same time, Senators O'Mahoney and Hatch sub-
mitted a proposal, carrying the endorsement of the N. A. I. C. and the
insurance industry with the exception of the stock fire companies,
limiting the moratorium from the antitrust laws to March 1, 1946.
The following day Congress adjourned, having failed to take action
on the several proposals. The 79th Congress was due to convene in.
January, however, and the ball would start rolling anew.
The new year began with a letter from the President to Senator
Radcliffe wherein the policy of the administration was declared to be
one not to interfere with state regulation and taxation, but to insist
that insurance should not be immune from antitrust legislation. The
O'Mahoney-Hatch bill, introduced in the prior Congress, was openly
approved. 27 On January 6, 1945, Senator O'Mahoney introduced sub-
stantially the same bill as he had offered earlier. Shortly thereafter,
Senators McCarron and Ferguson introduced S. B. 340 which was
similar to their former proposal. Their bill called for a moratorium
on the operation of the Sherman Act until June 1, 1947, and a more
extended one on the Clayton Act to January 1, 1948. It was sub-
mitted more or less as a compromise substitute for the O'Mahoney-
Hatch bill, and had the approval of the N. A. I. C. and the insurance
industry as a whole. The Senate judiciary committee reported a
recommendation that the bill pass and it was passed on January 25th
24 At that meeting the N. A. I. C., the state commissioners, the American Life
Convention, the Life Insurance Association of America, the Association of Mutual
Casualty Companies and others were represented. See The Nat. Underwriter, Life
Ins. Ed., Dec. 8, 1944, p. 6.
25 Stock fire insurance companies had not approved the N. A. I. C. legislative
draft.
26 McFall, op. cit., p. 73.
27 See letter from President Roosevelt to Senator Radcliffe, dated Jan. 2, 1945,
quoted in full in 264 Ins. L. J. 22 (1945).
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with but one change, namely: that the antitrust laws should not be
excepted under Section 2(B) of the statute.
25
No action of any kind had been taken in the House, perhaps be-
cause its membership was waiting to see what took place in the
Senate. A few days after the Senate had voted on its bill, the sub-
committee of the House judiciary committee recommended the pas-
sage thereof without the change made on the Senate floor, and without
the declaration of the intent of Congress to provide a moratorium.
Such bill was not favorably received by the Senate or the insurance
industry. Senator O'Mahoney, in fact, protested that the House
amendments would "kill the bill" if attempt was made to exempt
insurance completely from the antitrust laws.2 9 Nevertheless, the bill
did pass the House on February 14th by a vote of 315 to 57.
Because of the absence of agreement between House and Senate
measures, the matter went before a joint conference committee which
eventually agreed upon a conference report. That report was dif-
ferent from the House bill chiefly because it included the Federal
Trade Commission Act and the Robinson-Patman Acts within the
moratorium period, and expressly stipulated that there was to be no
exemption for acts of boycott, coercion or intimidation. The report
received approval in both branches of Congress and the amended
measure was sent to the White House where, on March 9th, it was
signed and became law.30 It is the only measure thus far which has
been enacted into law but it is obviously not a solution to the prob-
lems created by the S. E. A. U. decision. It merely postpones the
necessity for present affirmative action by Congress for almost three
years in order that the states might change existing laws to conform
to the decision.
28 Before amendment from the Senate floor, that section read: "No Act of
Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted
by any state for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which
imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such act specifically so provides."
The amendment placed the words "except the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended,
known as the Clayton Act" after the words "No Act of Congress" at the beginning
of the section.
29 As quoted in The Nat. Underwriter, Life Ins. Ed., Feb. 9, 1945, pp. 1 and 22.
20 59 Stat. 33, 15 U. S. C. A. § 1011 et seq. Section 1 of the statute declares the
Congressional purpose that continued regulation and taxation of the business of
insurance by the states is in the public Interest and Congressional silence is not to
be construed to impose barriers on state regulation. Section 2(a) expressly states
that existing state laws remain in operation. Section 2(b) indicates that state'
laws are to continue in effect unless a federal statute is enacted which specifically
relates to the insurance business. It, and Section 3(a), contain moratorium pro-
visions. The moratorium on the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, the Robinson-
Patman Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act, extends to January 1, 1948,
except that there is no moratorium on the provisions of the Sherman Act relating
to boycotts, coercion or intimidation. Section 4 states that existing federal legisla-
tion on labor matters has full application to the insurance business. A definition
of the term "state" is furnished in Section 5, and Section 6 contains the customary
separability clause.
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The burden, therefore, is now on the states. The bill granted
the premise that regulation by the states is in the public interest.
The states, however, are to retain control only if they can prove their
ability to control before January 1, 1948. Before that date, it is
expected that state action of all kinds will occur. Hasty legislation,
radical changes, refusal to change, good measures and bad will likely
appear. It appears too much to hope that forty-eight states will pass
legislation adequate, in Congressional judgment, to free the insurance
industry from imminent federal control. Test cases of various state
measures will undoubtedly arise, but the present prospect seems to
be that lack of uniformity of action will eventually give Congress
sufficient excuse to take over all-out regulation of the insurance busi-
ness. State failure to provide adequate regulation for transportation
led to the Interstate Commerce Commission. A federal Insurance
Commission appears looming on the horizon.
R. K. POWERS
CIVIL PRACTICE ACT CASES
APPEAL AND ERROR-REQUISITES AND PROCEEDINGS FOR TRANSFER OF
CAUSE-WHETHER OR NOT FILING OF MOTION IN TRIAL COURT TO VACATE
JUDGMENT OR DECREE OPERATES TO STAY RUNNING OF TIME FOR FILING
OF NOTICE OF APPEAL-A motion was made, in Corwin v. Rheims,' to
dismiss an appeal on the ground that the same had not been taken in
apt time. The original decree from which relief was sought had been
entered on February 2, 1944. Six days later, the unsuccessful plaintiff
moved to vacate such decree which motion was continued generally
and was not passed upon until May 19, 1944, when it was overruled.
Three days after the order overruling the motion to vacate the decree,
notice of appeal was filed in the trial court. It was urged that since
such notice was not filed within ninety days next following the date
of the original decree, as provided in Section 76 of the Civil Practice
Act,2 the appeal was taken too late to warrant consideration thereof.
Held: motion to dismiss the appeal denied.
The intimation contained in Defbler v. Bernard Brothers, Incor-
porated,3 to the effect that a motion to vacate a judgment does not
operate to stay the running of time within which to file notice of
appeal, was clarified in the instant case when it was pointed out that
the rule therein announced was proper in view of the fact that, sub-
sequent to the filing of such motion and before the same had been
determined, the appellant had filed a notice of appeal. Such action
1390 Ill. 205, 61 N. E. (2d) 40 (1945). Gunn, J., dissented over questions not
involved herein.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 200.
s 38 I1. 610, 53 N. E. (2d) 450 (1944), affirming 319 Il1. App. 504, 48 N. E. (2d)
422 (1943).
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was deemed to amount to a waiver of the motion to vacate the judg-
ment so as to make the judgment a final and appealable one from the
date of its original rendition.4 The same result does not follow when
the moving party refrains from filing notice of appeal, as in the
instant case, until his motion has been decided for such a judgment
or decree, in effect, has been suspended until the court can act on the
motion.5
It is true that Section 76 of the Civil Practice Act directs that no
appeal shall be taken after the expiration of ninety days "from the
entry of the order, decree, judgment or other determination com-
plained of."6 The term "entry," as used therein, must be understood
to mean the original date of entry in case no motion to vacate is
presented or, being presented, is withdrawn; but otherwise must be
read as meaning the date on which such motion was finally deter-
mined. 7 To hold otherwise would be to provide a snare for the
litigant who unsuccessfully endeavors to have the trial court correct
its own errors before seeking the aid of a higher court.
DISMISSAL AND NONSUIT-VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL-WHETHER OR NOT
ORDER OF DISMISSAL MAY BE VACATED AND CASE REINSTATED AGAINST A
DEFENDANT WHOM PLAINTIFF HAS VOLUNTARILY CAUSED TO BE DISMISSED
FROM SUIT-The series of errors made by plaintiff in Fulton v. Yon-
dorf' precipitated a chain of events that led to disastrous conse-
quences. The plaintiff there had brought an action against a single
defendant, both as trustee and in his individual capacity, seeking
damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained while
on certain premises owned by such defendant as trustee. At the close
of all the evidence, plaintiff voluntarily moved to dismiss the suit as
to the individual defendant and the case proceeded against the trus-
tee. After verdict against him in that capacity, he moved for judg-
ment in his favor notwithstanding the verdict.2 While that motion
was pending, plaintiff moved the court to vacate the order of volun-
tary dismissal, to reinstate the case as to the individual defendant,
and to amend the verdict by deleting the reference to the trustee so
as to make the same read as if it were a personal one. The trial court
granted the motion of defendant, in his trust capacity, for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict but at the same time. also granted plain-
tiff's motions to vacate the order of dismissal and to reinstate the
4 See also Marks v. Pope, 370 Ill. 597, 19 N. E. (2d) 616 (1939).
5Lenhart v. Miller, 375 Ill. 346, 31 N. E. (2d) 781 (1941) ; Hosking v. Southern
Pac. Co., 243 Ill. 320, 90 N. E. 669 (1910).
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 200 (1).
7 As to just what constitutes "entry" of the judgment or decree, see Snook v.
Shaw, 315 Ill. App. 594, 43 N. E. (2d) 417 (1942), noted in 21 CHIOAGo-KENT LAW
REVIEW 98.
1324 Ill. App. 452, 58 N. E. (2d) 640 (1944).
2 The liability of a trustee for tort growing out of the management of trust
premises is discussed in Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, Vol. 3, § 731 et seq.
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case as to the individual defendant. The court did, though, on its
own motion order a retrial of the cause.3 Upon appeal by the defend-
ant in his individual right, the Appellate Court held that after the
plaintiff had once voluntarily dismissed the defendant out of the case,
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to reinstate the cause as to him and
that plaintiff's remedy lay in instituting a new suit. The statute of
limitations had, however, run in the meantime so it was worthless for
plaintiff to begin the case anew.
The instant case appears to be the first one since the adoption of
the Civil Practice Act wherein an opinion has been reported in full
covering the precise question here involved. 4 The question had arisen
before that time, however, for in Weisguth v. Supreme Tribe of Ben
Hur5 the controlling rule was stated as follows: "In case of a volun-
tary nonsuit upon motion of a plaintiff the court has no power to
set aside the order of dismissal and reinstate the cause unless at the
time the nonsuit is taken leave is given the plaintiff to move to set
it aside." The reason given for such view is based on the fact that
if a plaintiff by his deliberate and voluntary act secures the dismissal
of his suit, he must be held to have anticipated the effect and neces-
sary results of this action, and should not be restored to the position
and rights which he voluntarily abandoned. His only remedy, after
dismissal, is to commence new proceedings and acquire jurisdiction
again in the usual fashion.7 A contrary result can be obtained, how-
ever, in case the order of dismissal is obtained by the defendant over
plaintiff's protest.8
The common-law rule announced in the Weisguth case has not
been specifically changed by any provision in the Civil Practice Act
although the practice of taking a voluntary nonsuit has been subjected
3 It was urged that, as defendant was appealing from an order granting a new
trial, he should have filed a petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat.
1943, Ch. 110, § 201. The court distinguished this case from those covered by the
statute on the ground that the provision thereof was restricted to cases wherein
a trial had, in fact, been had whereas in the instant case the defendant, in his
individual capacity, had never been granted a trial.
4 Becker v. Loebs Ins. Agency Co., 304 Ill. App. 575, 26 N. E. (2d) 653 (1940),
abstract opinion, and Moist v. Jones, 323 Ill. App. 286, 55 N. E. (2d) 556 (1944),
abstract opinion, in fact both reached the same result.
5 272 Ill. 541, 112 N. E. 350 (1916).
6 272 Ill. 541 at 543, 112 N. E. 350 at 351.
7 Thompson v. Otis, 285 Ill. App. 523, 2 N. E. (2d) 370 (1936), held that where
several defendants were involved in the original proceeding and one was dismissed
voluntarily, the plaintiff might, by filing an amended complaint and causing a
new summons to issue against the defendant so dismissed, avoid the effect of the
dismissal order since the action taken was the equivalent of bringing a new suit.
That method would be unavailing where a voluntary nonsuit is taken against the
sole defendant in the case.
8 See Watson v. Trinz, 274 Ill. App. 379 (1934).
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to some restrictions.9 Section 50(7) of that statute provides for the
setting aside of judgments or decrees within thirty days after the
entry thereof' ° but that provision has been held inapplicable to volun-
tary nonsuits," so no benefit can be gained therefrom. Interlocutory
orders may, of course, be amended or vacated at any time prior to
final judgment, but an order of dismissal is a final one so cannot be
included in any such category. It must be deduced, therefore, that
the intent of the legislature was not to change the law relating to the
rights of the parties growing out of voluntary nonsuits when the
Civil Practice Act was adopted.
Although the rule, as applied in the instant case, could well be
gaid to work a hardship on the particular litigant, it does not seem
unreasonable to force a plaintiff to take the foreseeable consequences
of his voluntary acts. The holding should serve, however, as a warn-
ing to any plaintiff to exercise extreme caution before making a
motion to dismiss a defendant from a case.
P. E. MONTGOMERY
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 176. See also Flassig v. Newman, 317 Ill. App.
635, 47 N. E. (2d) 527 (1943), noted in 21 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEw 348. In
Bernick v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 325 Ill. App. 495, 60 N. U. (2d) 442 (1945),
it was held that a voluntary nonsuit should be denied where defendant had filed
a motion under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 172, based on the ground that the
cause of action asserted therein had been previously adjudicated.
10Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 174(7). The plaintiff in Becker v. Loebs Ins.
Agency Co., 304 Ill. App. 575, 26 N. E. (2d) 653 (1940), abst. opin., relied on a
comparable provision in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 77, § 83, to no avail.
11 Moist v. Jones, 323 Ill. App. 286, 55 N. E. (2d) 556 (1944), abst. opin.
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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
ALIENS-DISABILITIES-WHETHER OR NOT REAL ESTATE HELD IN
TRUST FOR BENEFIT OF ALIEN MAY BE FORFEITED BY THE STATE-In the
case of People ex rel. Kunstman v. Shinsaku Nagano,' a private citizen
filed an information in the name of the People of the State of Illinois
seeking to forfeit real estate allegedly held by an alien. The action
was based on the Aliens Act 2 which permits aliens to acquire and
hold real estate by deed, devise or descent, and to transfer, devise or
encumber it, but prohibits the holding of title for more than six
years.8 That statute also provides that unless the land is conveyed
to a bona fide non-alien purchaser for value or the alien is naturalized
within such time, the state's attorney for the county in which the land
is situated must proceed to compel sale. If he neglects to do so for
thirty days after notice and demand, the statute directs that any
citizen may sue in the name of the people, although the proceeds of
sale, after deducting fees and costs, are to go to the state. The in-
1389 Ill. 231, 59 N. E. (2d) 96 (1945).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 6, § 1 et seq.
3 If the alien is an infant at the time of acquisition of the land, he may hold title
for six years after he reaches majority: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 6, § 2.
330
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formation charged that Nagano, an alien, had purchased Illinois land;
had held it for more than six years without having conveyed to a
bona fide non-alien purchaser for value nor having become natural-
ized; but had, more than six years after acquisition and prior to suit,
conveyed the land to an Illinois banking corporation to hold in trust
for the alien as beneficiary. The trust agreement declared that the
beneficiary's only interest was to be treated as personal property.4
It was also alleged that demand had been made on the state's attorney,
but that official had failed to take action. A motion to dismiss the in-
formation, based on several grounds, was sustained by the lower court
although that court specified no precise reason for such action. The
Illinois Supreme Court, on appeal, affirmed for the reason that Section
2 of the Aliens Act, to the extent that it provided for suit by a private
citizen, was unconstitutional as improperly attempting to authorize
persons not having the responsibility of office to exercise constitu-
tional powers vested in the state's attorney. Left wholly undecided
was the equally important question of whether or not a transfer to a
citizen in trust for the benefit of an alien would prevent forfeiture.
The court's decision, so far as it proceeds, rests upon the acknowl-
edged truth that the sovereign is the ultimate proprietor of all lands
within its boundaries, and it alone possesses the power to regulate
how real estate may be acquired and transferred. 5 Therefore, a pro-
ceeding to divest an alien of real estate involves a public interest and
should be carried out only by a public official,6 for the privilege to
forfeit for alienage is not a prerogative of one but the collective right
of all the citizens of the state. The constitutional representatives of
the state, in proceedings ,by the state affecting a public interest, ought
not be stripped of the inherent functions of their offices by legislative
enactment.
While the court found it unnecessary to decide the real issue of
the case, i. e. whether or not a transfer in trust to a citizen for the
benefit of an alien is a bona fide conveyance to a non-alien purchaser
for Yalue within the definition of the Aliens Act, that problem is one
of grave importance in this state and one on which no authoritative
statement has been made as yet. A solution may, however, be gleaned
by considering the history of land forfeiture because of alienage as
it has been worked out in the decisions of other courts.
4The statute permits the alien to acquire and hold personal property without
limitation: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 6, § 7.
5 Wunderle v. Wunderle, 144 Ill. 40, 33 N. E. 195, 19 L. R. A. 84 (1893).
6 Fergus v. Russell, 270 Ill. 304, 110 N. E. 130, Ann. Cas. 1916B 1120 (1915);
People ex rel. Courtney v. Ashton, 358 Ill. 146, 192 N. E. 820 (1934) ; Ashton v.
Cook County, 384 Ill. 287, 51 N. E. (2d) 161 (1943).
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At common law, aliens could acquire land by purchase or devise
but not by descent, by act of the parties, but not by operation of law.
7
Such restriction has remained in effect except where changed by
statute,8 and in this state the right of an alien to acquire and hold land
has been modified but slightly.9 The title thus acquired is not divested
except through a judicial proceeding designated "office found," insti-
tuted by the appropriate public official, authoritatively establishing
the fact of alienage. Such proceeding is necessary and vital to pro-
tect the individual from an arbitrary and unreasonable seizure of his
lands by the sovereign. Office found, or its Illinois equivalent, 10
renders the forfeiture a matter of record, allows for notice and hear-
ing, and contemplates that reunion with the public domain will not
take place until judgment is rendered." As a consequence, an alien
who has lawfully acquired and holds land may continue so to hold
against the whole world until office found, and may convey good title
by deed or gift.
12
There is no doubt that a state may regulate indirect as well as
direct ownership and control of land within its boundaries by aliens, 13
for the policy of that rule is said to rest upon the ground that it is
7 King v. Boys, 3 Dyer 283 pl. 31, 73 Eng. Rep. 636 (1569) ; Anonymous, 1 Leon.
47, 74 Eng. Rep. 44 (1586) ; King v. Holland, Aleyn 14, 82 Eng. Rep. 889 (1648) ;
Attorney General v. Sands, 2 Freem. Ch. 129, 22 Eng. Rep. 1106 (1670) ; Attorney
General v. Duplessis, Parke 144, 145 Eng. Rep. 739 (1752) ; Fairfax's Devisee v.
Hunter's Lessee, 11 U. S. (7 Cranch) 603, 3 L. Ed. 453 (1813) ; Phillips v. Moore,
100 U. S. 208, 25 L. Ed. 603 (1879). See also 2 Am. Jur., Aliens, § 29; Tiffany,
Real Property, 3d Ed., Vol. 5, § 1377; Washburn, Real Property, 6th Ed., § 131.
8 The right of a state to exclude aliens from acquiring property within its
boundaries to the extent that its safety or policy may direct, except as regulated
by treaty, is not a violation of the equal protection clause of the Federal constitu-
tion. Cockrill v. California, 268 U. S. 258, 45 S. Ct. 490, 69 L. Ed. 944 (1925),
upholding a California statute which forbade aliens, ineligible for citizenship, to
acquire, use, or control agricultural lands and provided for the escheat thereof.
In Toop v. Ulysses Land Co., 237 U. S. 580, 35 S. Ct. 739, 59 L. Ed. 1127 (1915),
a claim that a state statute was repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment was
characterized as too frivolous to support the taking of jurisdiction by the Federal
Supreme Court.
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 6, § 1, permits the acquisition of land by descent. See
also John v. John, 322 Ill. 236, 153 N. E. 363 (1926).
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 6, §§ 2-4.
11 Phillips v. Moore, 100 U. S. 208, 25 L. Ed. 603 (1879) ; United States v. De-
Repentigny, 72 U. S. (5 Wall.) 211, 18 L. Ed. 627 (1867) ; Wunderle v. Wunderle,
144 Ill. 40, 33 N. E. 195, 19 L. R. A. 84 (1893).
12 Osterman v. Baldwin, 73 U. S. (6 Wall.) 116, 18 L. Ed. 730 (1867) ; Mott v.
Cline, 200 Cal. 434, 253 P. 718 (1927) ; George v. People, 180 Misc. 635, 40 N. Y. S.
(2d) 830 (1943), affirmed in 267 App. Div. 575, 47 N. Y. S. (2d) 681 (1944) ; State
v. Superior Ct. of Snohomish County, 165 Wash. .648, 5 P. (2d) 1037 (1931); State
v. Kosai, 133 Wash. 442, 234 P. 5 (1925) ; Abrams v. State, 45 Wash. 327, 88 P. 327,
9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 186, 122 Am. St. Rep. 914, 13 Ann. Cas. 527 (1907) ; Dutton v.
Donahue, 44 Wyo. 52, 8 P. (2d) 90, 79 A. L. R. 1355 (1932). See also annotation
to Re Melrose Avenue, 234 N. Y. 48, 136 N. E. 235 (1922), in 23 A. L. R. 1233,
particularly p. 1249, and Washburn, Real Property, 6th Ed., § 131.
13 Frick v. Webb, 263 U. S. 326, 44 S. Ct. 115, 68 L. Ed. 323 (1923), affirming 281
F. 407 (1922). See also cases cited in 3 C. J. S., Aliens, § 12.
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"unwise to permit the soil of the country to be in the hands of the
subjects of a foreign power, and its revenues to be enjoyed by them;
since the state must be impoverished by transporting the revenues of
the land into foreign countries and weakened by putting a part of its
territory under subjection to a foreign prince." 14  The prohibition
against aliens holding title to land has also been said to depend on
the idea that title should be in the hands of citizens who owe alle-
giance to the government and can be called upon to discharge the
duties of citizenship. 15
The same principle which forbids or limits legal ownership of
lands by an alien extends also to equitable ownership thereof, so that
if the alien may not hold land in his own name, he may not hold land
in the name of a trustee, as that would permit him to accomplish
indirectly what he is forbidden to do directly.16 A trust in real
property for the benefit of an alien is valid, however, where by the
laws of the state he might take and hold title to the real property
itself, at least for a period of time.
17
There would seem to be no reason why a use or trust in real
estate for the benefit of an alien should not be regarded as valid until
proceedings by the state, for no one has a right to complain in a col-
lateral proceeding if the sovereign does not enforce its prerogative.
Such a trust would not be void as between grantor and grantee,' 8 and
it would seem that the state, by virtue of office found, could not oust
the trustee who is seized in fee of the lands so held in trust for the
alien, although a court of equity might enforce the trust for the
benefit of the government. 19 But equity would never raise a resulting
trust based on a violation of positive law, so if an alien purchased
land and took an absolute conveyance in the name of a citizen without
any agreement or declaration of trust, the law would not raise a trust
in favor of the alien purchaser if he could not himself hold the title
to the land, any more than it would cast title by descent on the alien
14 Hubbard v. Goodwin, 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 492 at 514 (1832).
15 Marx v. McGlynn, 88 N. Y. 357 (1882).
16 Atkins v. Kron, 48 N. C. (5 Ired.) 207 (1848); State v. Morrison, 18 Wash.
664, 52 P. 228 (1898). See also 1 R. C. L., Aliens, § 32, p. 823.
17 In Kalies v. Ewart, 248 Ill. 612, 94 N. E. 105 (1911), the alien was permitted
to become trustee over lands, subject to the limitfitions of the statute. See also
Hayden v. Sugden, 48 Misc. 108, 96 N. Y. S. 681 (1905).
18 Osterman v. Baldwin, 73 U. S. (6 Wall.) 116, 18 L. Ed. 730 (1867) ; Taylor v.
Benham, 46 U. S. (5 How.) 233, 12 L. Ed. 130 (1847) ; Craig v. Leslie, 16 U. S.
(3 Wheat.) 563, 4 L. Ed. 460 (1818); Isaacs v. DeHon, 11 F. (2d) 943 (1926);
Hammekin v. Clayton, Fed. Cas. No. 5996 (1874) ; Vlahos v. Andrews, 362 Ill. 593,
1 N. E. (2d) 59 (1936) ; Ales v. Epstein, 283 Mo. 434, 222 S. W. 1012 (1920);
Koyoko Nishi v. Downing, 21 Cal. App. (2d) 1, G7 P. (2d) 1057 (1937). See also
2 Am. Jur., Aliens, § 55.
19 Attorney General v. Duplessis, Parke 144, 145 Eng. Rep. 739 (1752); Attorney
General v. Sands, 2 Freem. Ch. 129, 22 Eng. Rep. 1106 (1670) ; McCaw v. Galbraith,
7 Rich. Law (S. C.) 74 (1853).
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heir. The result in such a case must either be that the nominal
grantee takes the land discharged of any trust or else that there is
a resulting trust in behalf of the people of the state which they alone
can enforce against the grantee. The former is the view that has been
adopted wherever the question has arisen.
20
On the other hand, if the alien, to evade the law, purchases lands
in the name of a trustee upon an express and declared or secret trust
entitling the alien to take and receive the rents and profits, such a
trust, upon established principles of equity, will pass to the state to
be enforced at its instance and in its favor. 21 To hold otherwise
would be to destroy the very object and purpose of the law and make
it possible, at very little inconvenience and cost, for the alien to cir-
cumvent it. If one is entitled to the rents and profits of land as well
as the sale price, including therein any increase in value, he has the
real substance of ownership and is deprived only of the" privilege of
holding the actual legal title and the attributes of possession and
control. 22 So, too, if a conveyance be fraudulently made by the alien
to prevent forfeiture, such conveyance may be attacked by the state
and set aside just as any other fraudulent conveyance may be at-
tacked.23 However, a conveyance of land to a citizen, in trust to sell
the same and to pay the proceeds to an alien creditor, has been held
valid so that the interest of the alien in the proceeds is not subject
to forfeiture.
24
In the light of these authorities, it would seem clear that had the
court in the instant case decided the problem on the merits rather
than on the limited question of the right and capacity of a private
citizen to sue, it would necessarily have reached an opposite result.
A trust of land for the benefit of an alien who retains the right to the
rents and profits for longer than the statutory period, even though in
the guise of a personal property interest, would seem to be a clear
evasion of the principles prohibiting an alien from holding land and
should warrant a decree of forfeiture.
RUTH MARKMAN
20 In re Tetsubumi Yano's Estate, 188 Cal. 645, 206 P. 995 (1922) ; Ales v. Epstein,
283 Mo. 434, 222 S. W. 1012 (1920) ; Leggett v. Dubois, 5 Paige (N. Y.) 114, 28 Am.
Dec. 413 (1835).
21 Legget v. Dubois, 5 Paige (N. Y.) 114, 28 Am. Dec. 413 (1835); Anstice v.
Brown, 6 Paige (N. Y.) 448 (1837); Hubbard v. Goodwin, 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 492
(1832) ; McCaw v. Galbraith, 7 Rich. Law (S. C.) 74 (1853) ; Dutton v. Donahue,
44 Wyo. 52, 8 P. (2d) 90, 79 A. L. R. 1355 (1932).
22 State v. O'Connell, 121 Wash. 542, 209 P. 865 (1922).
2s Louisville School Board v. King, 127 Ky. 824, 107 S. W. 247, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.)
379 (1908) ; State v. Kusumi, 136 Wash. 432, 240 P. 556 (1925) ; Abrams v. State,
45 Wash. 327, 88 P. 327, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 186, 122 Am. St. Rep. 914, 13 Ann. Cas.
527 (1907).
24 Anstice v. Brown, 6 Paige (N. Y.) 448 (1837).
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
DEEDS-CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION-WHETHER OR NOT CONVEY-
ANCE BY HOLDER OF TITLE, JOINED IN BY SPOUSE, TO UN-NAMED GRANTEE
DESIGNATED AS "SURVIVOR" OPERATES TO PASS TITLE TO SPOUSE-In Pure
Oil Company v. Bayler,1 the Illinois Supreme Court had occasion to
pass upon the validity of a deed to certain land owned in fee simple
by one Henry Gray in which deed the grantor and his wife purported
to convey the premises to themselves not by name but by the words
"to the survivor in Fee Simple forever survivor to dispose of [as]
they shall see fit to do." The husband-grantor predeceased his wife.
After the death of both parties, neither leaving children surviving, a
dispute arose between the respective heirs of the husband and wife
with reference to the effect of the deed. The Illinois Supreme Court,
affirming a decision of the trial court, held that the title to the real
estate in question vested in the wife upon delivery of the deed subject,
however, to a condition of defeasance if she should predecease her
husband. Upon a finding that she had survived him, it was declared
that title vested in her heirs.
Three major contentions were advanced by the heirs of the hus-
band to establish their claim to an interest in the land, namely: (1)
that the deed was void because of uncertainty; (2) if not void, that it
conveyed only an undivided one-half interest to the wife as a tenant
in common because it was an unsuccessful attempt to create a joint
tenancy; and (3) that it was an attempted testamentary disposition of
the property without meeting the formal requirements of the statute
applicable thereto. Disposition of the second and third contentions was
deemed to be a matter of comparative ease. There was said to be no
attempt to create an estate in joint tenancy for the reason that all of
the land in question was conveyed. In cases where it has been held
that a conveyance by one person to himself and another as joint
tenants operates to convey only an undivided one-half interest to the
other as tenant in common, it was manifest that the grantor intended
to retain an equal share for himself, with the result that the four
unities of time, title, interest and possession, essentials of a joint
estate, were lacking. 2 It could not be successfully contended that
the deed was an attempted last will and testament for cases of that
character are based on lack of legal delivery.3 Delivery of the deed
here in question was not challenged.
The most perplexing problem which the court had to solve in
reaching its decision was whether or not the identity of the grantee
was made certain. It is well established that to be effective, a deed
must designate as grantee an existing person in whom title can and
1388 Ill. 331, 58 N. E. (2d) 26 (1944).
2 Deslauriers v. Senesac, 331 Ill. 437, 163 N. E. 327 (1928) ; Porter v. Porter, 381
111. 322, 45 N. E. (2d) 635 (1943).
3 Elliott v. Murray, 225 Ill. 107, 80 N. E. 77 (1906) ; Benner v. Bailey, 234 Ill.
79, 84 N. E. 638 (1908).
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does immediately vest.4 In holding that the unnamed "survivor" was
such a grantee, the court found it necessary to ascertain and follow
the real intention of the parties as gathered from the entire instru-
ment and the surrounding circumstances.5 The deed was inartificially
drawn upon a printed blank, the spaces of which had undoubtedly
been filled out by the grantor. The word "survivor," as used in this
deed, obviously was intended to refer back to the only parties named
therein, to-wit: the grantors. Inasmuch as a person cannot convey
to himself that which he already owns,6 the deed operated to convey
nothing to the husband. But the inclusion of a grantee who cannot
take title does not vitiate a deed if there is another grantee capable
of taking,7 so it followed that there was an effective conveyance to
the wife. Designation of a grantee need not be by name if he or she
is described with sufficient certainty to distinguish him or her from
all other persons.8
There does not appear to be any other case, either in Illinois or
elsewhere, involving a parallel set of facts. The designation of the
grantee in the deed in question is not analogous to that found in deeds
where, for example, the attempted conveyance was to "the members"
of a named church, 9 or to "the inhabitants" of two named districts,10
or to "each and every attorney at law in Iowa."" Such deeds have
rightly been held void as being too indefinite for they tend to violate
the policy of the law not to allow title to realty to be permanently
tied up. In the deed here involved, on the other hand, there were
only two persons named, and one of those was incapable of conveying
to himself. It seems logical, therefore, that the court should have
held that there was a valid conveyance to the grantee who could take
title.
P. E. MONTGOMERY
4 Duffield v. Duffield, 268 Ill. 29, 108 N. E. 673 (1915) ; Legout v. Price, 318 Ill.
425, 149 N. E. 427 (1925); Albers v. Donovan, 371 Ill. 45S, 21 N. E. (2d) 563
(1939) ; Herrick v. Lain, 375 Il. 569, 32 N. E. (2d) 154 (1941) ; Chance v. Kimbrell,
376 Ill. 615, 35 N. E. (2d) 48 (1941).
5 Texas Co. v. O'Meara, 377 11. 144, 36 N. E. (2d) 256 (1941) ; Porter v. Porter,
381 Ill. 322, 45 N. E. (2d) 635 (1943) ; Henry v. Metz, 382 Ill. 297, 46 N. E. (2d)
945 (1943) ; Shell Oil Co. v. Moore, 382 Ii1. 556, 48 N. E. (2d) 400 (1943) ; Law v.
Kane, 384 Ill. 591, 52 N. E. (2d) 212 (1944).
6 Deslauriers v. Senesac, 331 Ill. 437, 163 N. E. 327 (1928). See also 18 C. J.,
Deeds, § 36, p. 159; 26 C. J. S., Deeds, § 13, p. 185.
7 See Creighton v. Elgin, 387 I1. 592, 56 N. E. (2d) 825 (1944) noted in 23
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEW 263; Hartwidk v. Heberling, 364 Ill. 523, 4 N. E. (2d)
965 (1936) ; Herrick v. Lain, 375 Ill. 569, 32 N. E. (2d) 154 (1941).
8 16 Am. Jur., Deeds, § 76, p. 482; 18 C. J., Deeds, § 56, p. 174; 26 C. J. S., Deeds,
§ 24, p. 205.
9 Morris v. State, 84 Ala. 457, 4 So. 628 (1888).
10 Hunt v. Tolles, 75 Vt. 48, 52 A. 1042 (1902).
11 State v. McGee, 200 Iowa 329, 204 N. W. 408 (1925).
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
LANDLORD AND TENANT-TERMS FOR YEARS-WHETHER OR NOT TEN-
ANT MAY TERMINATE LEASE BECAUSE OF LIMITATIONS IMPOSED ON USE
OF PREMISES BY WARTIME REGULATIONS-In Crosby v. Baron-Huot Oil
Company,' the Appellate Court for the Second District had occasion
to decide whether the tenant, under a fifteen-year lease made in 1931,
had the right to terminate his lease because of restrictive govern-
mental wartime regulations where a provision in the lease permitted
termination if ". . . the use of the said premises for an oil and gasoline
filling station be prevented, suspended or limited by any zoning
statute, or ordinance, or any other Municipal or Governmental action
or law, or regulation. .. ." The tenant contended that, under this
provision, it was not liable for rent in view of its formal notice to
the lessor of its election to terminate the lease on account of the
rationing of tires, tubes, gasoline and automobiles by the Office of
Price Administration, the restriction on credit sales of these products,
and the limitation on hours of operation imposed by the Petroleum
Administration for War. The trial court held the tenant liable for
rent, interpreting the cancellation clause as applying only to real
estate regulations, i. e. those affecting the use of the particular
property as distinguished from the business conducted thereon. The
Appellate Court, however, took the opposite view, holding that the
intent of the parties, as evidenced by the clause in question, was to
permit cancellation upon governmental restriction of the ordinary
business of operating and maintaining a filling station. It, therefore,
reversed the judgment.
The interpretation of the phrase "use of the said premises,"
when employed in this connection, has been considered by courts in
other jurisdictions with somewhat conflicting albeit not wholly irrec-
oncilable results. Where the phrase was used, as here, in conjunc-
tion with the words "prevented, suspended or limited" the Kentucky
and Minnesota courts interpreted it as covering more than mere real
estate restrictions and as extending to restrictions on the conduct
of the business apart from the real estate.2 On the other hand, when
the phrase was used, in one instance,8 with the words "prevented"
and "restricted" and, in another, 4 with the words "prohibited, limited
or restricted," the New York courts interpreted it as applying merely
to real estate restrictions and as being ineffective to create a right
in the tenant to terminate the lease because of wartime business regu-
lation. The court, in Mid-Continent Petroleum Corporation v.
1324 Ill. App. 651, 59 N. E. (2d) 520 (1945).
2 Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Barrett, 297 Ky. 709, 181 S. W. (2d) 60
(1944) ; Orme v. Atlas Gas & Oil Co., 217 Minn. 27, 13 N. W. (2d) 757 (1944).
3 Robitzek Investing Co. v. Colonial Beacon Oil Co,, 40 N. Y. S. (2d) 819, 265
App. Div. 749 (1943), leave to appeal denied 291 N. Y. 830, 50 N. E. (2d) 555.
4 First Nat. Bank of New Rochelle v. Fairchester Oil Co., Inc., 45 N. Y. S. (2d)
532, 267 App. Div. 281 (1943), affirmed in 292 N. Y. 694, 56 N. E. (2d) 111 (1944),
cert. den. 323 U. S. -, 65 S. Ct. 69, 89 L. Ed. (adv.) 43 (1944).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Barrett,5 attempted to distinguish these rulings by pointing out that
the words "prevented" and "restricted" are usually used in speaking
of real property, whereas the words "suspended or limited" have no
such connotation. There is little to distinguish the facts of the four
cases noted, however, other than a slight difference in the words
used in the cancellation clause so, despite the admitted merit of the
attempt to reconcile these divergent opinions, it would appear that
the cases really represent two distinct viewpoints. The Illinois court,
therefore, had some precedent for its holding particularly since the
language used in the two cases similarly decided was virtually iden-
tical with that found in the Illinois lease, while the opposing cases
dealt with leases using slightly different phraseology.
Several cases have been argued during this war wherein the tenant
has sought to have the lease terminated because of governmental
restrictions on the business conducted in the demised premises even
though the lease contained no such option as is found in the instant
case. The majority of these cases involved leases of premises to be
used as filling stations or automobile sales and service stations. The
arguments propounded in support of such attempts have been based
on the "commercial frustration" doctrine or on what amounts to the
same thing, namely: that the -lessee has been deprived of the con-
templated beneficial use of the premises. Prior wars have not given
rise to any such regulation of business as has characterized the
present one. Consequently, while commercial frustration is not a
new doctrine, there has been no direct precedent prior to now for
situations where the frustration arises through governmental regula-
tions of a restrictive but not of a prohibitive nature.
The closest analogy is to be found in the prohibition cases,
although they reflect a situation of absolute interdiction whereas war-
time regulation generally has not wholly stopped but merely limited
certain business activities. Many conflicting decisions concerning
the rights of landlords and tenants under leases for saloon purposes
were promulgated during the period of the Eighteenth Amendment.
Where the lessee expressly reserved the right to terminate the lease
in the event of prohibition, the tenant was, of course, allowed to
cancel.6 Where that right was not reserved, the majority of courts
held that the lessee could terminate the lease anyway, 7 although there
5297 Ky. 709, 181 S. W. (2d) 60 (1944).
rHooper v. Mueller, 158 Mich. 595, 123 N. W. 24 (1909) ; Kahn v. Wilhelm, 118
Ark. 239, 177 S. W. 403 (1915).
7 Levy v. Johnston & Hunt, 224 Ill. App. 300 (1922) ; Greil Bros. Co. v. Mabson,
179 Ala. 444, 60 So. 876 (1912); Kahn v. Wilhelm, 118 Ark. 239, 177 S. W. 403
(1915) ; Christopher v. Charles Blum Co., 78 Fla. 240, 82 So. 765 (1919) ; Schaub
v. Wright, 79 Ind. App. 56,. 130 N. E. 143 (1921) ; Halloran v. Jacob Schmidt
Brewing Co., 137 Minn. 141, 162 N. W. 1082 (1917) ; Kaiser v. Zeigler, 187 N. Y. S.
638, 115 Misc. 281 (1921) ; Heart v. East Tennessee Brewing Co., 121 Tenn. 69,
113 S. W. 364 (1908) ; Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. Seattle Brewing & Malting
Co., 98 Wash. 12, 167 P. 58 (1917).
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was a respectable minority view which held that as the lessee had
failed to foresee this contingency and protect himself against it, he
was bound to pay rent despite the fact that prohibition made impos-
sible the only use permitted by the lease.8 Where the lease permitted
other uses of the premises, although use for the sale of spiritous
liquors was the principal use intended, prohibition did not, according
to the majority rule, operate to relieve the lessee of his obligations. 9
Cases arising out of wartime business regulations have not been
as strong as the saloon cases because, as pointed out before, these
regulations have generally been restrictive rather than prohibitive.
The question of the right of the lessee to terminate because of such
regulations, in the absence of any express provision granting him such
an option, was before an Illinois court in the case of Deibler v.
Bernard Brothers, Incorporated,0 but the court there did not have
to decide that issud for, although the lease described the premises as
an auto showroom and garage, the court found the lessee was not
restricted to such use but could make any other legitimate use of the
premises. Generally, however, the courts have held that the tenant
is not released even though the use of the premises is restricted to
business activities which have been severely curtailed by wartime
regulations. Thus, leases restricting use of the premises to the sale
and service of automobiles," to the sale of automobiles and auto-
mobile accessories, 12 to the sale of gasoline,' 3 to tire and battery sales
and service, 14 to the sale of tires and automobile supplies where actual
operations had been confined to tire sales,' 5 or to gasoline filling sta-
tion purposes' 6 have been held enforcible even though wartime regu-
lations made profitable operation impossible. In all such cases, the
courts uniformly found that the restricted uses of the demised prem-
ises as fixed by the terms of the several leases were still possible to
some degree, so the liability to pay rent remained.
8 Goldrum Tobacco Co. v. Potts-Thompson Liquor Co., 133 Ga. 776, 66 S. E. 1081
(1910) ; Hecht v. Acme Coal Co., 19 Wyo. 18, 113 P. 788 and 117 P. 132 (1911).
9 Christopher v. Charles Blum Co., 78 Fla. 240, 82 So. 765 (1919) ; Home Brew-
ing Co. v. Kaufman, 78 Ind. App. 462, 133 N. E. 842 (1922); Shreveport Ice &
Brewing Co. v. Mandel Bros., 128 La. 314, 54 So. 831 (1911); Standard Brewing
Co. v. Weil, 129 Md. 487, 99 A. 661 (1916). Contra: Doherty v. Monroe Eckstein
Brewing Co., 191 N. Y. S. 59, 198 App. Div. 708, affirming 187 N. Y. S. 633 (1921).
10 385 Ill. 610, 53 N. E. (2d) 450 (1944), affirming 319 Ill. App. 504, 48 N. E. (2d)
422 (1943), noted in 23 CHIcAG0-KENT LAW REvImw 11.
-1 Byrnes v. Balcom, 38 N. Y. S. (2d) 801, 265 App. Div. 268 (1942), affirmed in
290 N. Y. 730, 49 N. E. (2d) 10(4 (1943).
12 Colonial Operating Corp. v. Hannan Sales & Service, Inc., 39 N. Y. S. (2d)
217, 265 App. Div. 411 (1943).
13 Knorr v. Jack & Al, Inc., 38 N. Y. S. (2d) 406, 179 Misc. 603 (1942).
14 Davidson v. Goldstein, 59 Cal. App. (2d) 909, 136 P. (2d) 665 (1943).
15 Mitchell v. Ceazan Tires, Ltd., 25 Cal. (2d) -, 153 P. (2d) 53 (1944).
16 Wood v. Bartolino, 48 N. M. 175, 146 P. (2d) 883 (1944).
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A more restrictive lease was involved in the California case of
Lloyd v. Murphy17 where the tenant held under a lease made for the
"sole purpose of ... the business of displaying and selling new auto-
-mobiles (including the servicing and repairing thereof and of selling
the petroleum products of a major oil company) and for no other
purposes whatsoever without the written consent of the lessor" except
to make "an occasional sale of a used automobile." The tenant was
also denied the right to sublease except with the lessor's consent.
After the government had greatly limited these business activities,
the tenant explained to the lessor the degree to which his business
would be curtailed and the lessor offered to reduce the rent, to waive
the lease provisions with respect to the limitations on use, and to
allow the tenant to sublet the property if he chose to do so. The
tenant, nevertheless, vacated and gave notice that he considered the
lease terminated. When deciding against the tenant, the court said
that, for the tenant to be relieved on the ground ol commercial frustra-
tion, he must prove "that the risk of the frustrating event was not
reasonably foreseeable and that the value of counterperformance is
totally or nearly totally destroyed. ... 18i The mere fact that per-
formance had become unprofitable, more difficult, or more expensive
did not excuse the tenant, particularly since the National Defense
Act19 had been in effect for more than a year prior to the time when
the lease was executed, thereby giving notice that restrictions of
the sort complained of might come into existence at any time during
the term.
Of doubtful authority, in view of the foregoing more recent
decision of a higher court, is the decision of an intermediate Cali-
fornia court in 20th Century Lites, Inc. v. Goodman,20 holding that
the lessee of neon advertising lights for use outdoors was released
by the dimout regulations. The lessor there sought a ruling that the
lease had merely been suspended and not terminated. It pointed out
that the display was custom-made and suitable only for the particular
lessee, but the court held that the lease had been completely terminated
by the original restriction against outdoor lighting displays and could
not be revived, even though daytime use was possible throughout the
entire period.
Courts have stated that if the governmental wartime regulation
amounts to a complete prohibition of all the uses permitted under
the lease, such regulation would terminate the obligations created
thereby. These statements, however, have been made in opinions
holding that the plaintiff-lessor was not entitled to summary judg-
1 25 Cal. (2d) -, 153 P. (2d) 47 (1944).
1825 Cal. (2d) -- at -, 153 P. (2d) 47 at 50.
19 50 U. S. C. A. § 1152(2).
20 64 Cal. App. (2d) 938, 149 P. (2d) 88 (1944).
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ment for rent and that the lessee should have his day in court to
prove, if he could, "that the primary and principal purpose for which
[he] leased the premises has been destroyed by reason of government
regulations."' 21 These cases do not determine that wartime restriction
of business has in fact accomplished such destruction of the beneficial
use of the premises as to vitiate the tenant's obligation to pay rent.
They, too, therefore provide an uncertain basis for the claim that
governmental regulation necessarily means an end to the tenant's
obligations.
The tenor of the current decisions, then, is to the effect that a
tenant cannot terminate his lease even though the business activities
permitted by the lease have been sharply curtailed by governmental
wartime regulation. Nothing short of virtually complete prohibition
of all business uses allowed by the terms of the lease will suffice to
permit termination on the ground of commercial frustration if there
is no escape clause appearing therein. Where such an escape clause
is employed, care should be taken to assure that the language used
is not susceptible of a more limited interpretation than was intended.
Although the Appellate Court has, in the instant case, interpreted the
language in favor of the tenant, the holding is a close one and a slight
change in the words used might easily have led to an opposite result.
J. F. PARTRIDGE
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-COMPUTATION OF PERIOD OF LIMITATION-
WHETHER OR NOT PENDENCY OF PROCEEDING IN COURT LACKING JURIS-
DICTION OPERATES TO TOLL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONs-The plaintiff
brought an action in the City Court of Granite City predicated upon
the Federal Employers' Liability ActI and the Federal Safety Appli-
ances Act2 for the loss of his foot while trying to set a brake on a
railway car. The brake was defective. The jury found for the plain-
tiff, but the court returned a judgment non obstante veredicto for the
defendant on the ground that the plaintiff was not working in inter-
state commerce. Upon appeal, in Herb v. Pitcairn,3 the Appellate
Court upheld the plaintiff's contention that the question of interstate
commerce was a fact for the jury to find, and that there was sufficient
evidence to support their findings. It, therefore, under the Civil
Practice Act 4 reversed and reinstated the verdict of the jury. The
defendant appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court on the ground that
the provision of the Practice Act under which the Appellate Court
21 Canrock Realty Corp. v. Vim Electric Co., 37 N. Y. S. (2d) 139 at 141, 179
Misc. 391 at 393 (1942). Of like effect is Shantz v. American Auto Supply Co., 36
N. Y. S. (2d) 747, 178 Misc. 909 (1942).
'45 U. S. C. A. § 51 et seq.
245 U. S. C. A. § 1 et seq.
.3306 Ill. App. 583, 29 N. E. (2d) 543 (1940).
4Ill. Rev. Stat. 1930, Ch. 110, § 192(3)c.
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reversed the judgment and reinstated the verdict was unconstitu-
tional.5 That court pointed out that it had previously held the pro-
vision to be unconstitutional.6 It, therefore, reversed and remanded
with directions to send the case back to the circuit court to entertain
a motion for a new trial, or, if denied, to enter judgment on the origi-
nal verdict.
In the meantime, the Illinois Supreme Court had decided two
cases in which it was held that city courts were limited in their
jurisdiction.7 As the accident took place outside of Granite City,
the court in which the proceeding was originally instituted lacked
jurisdiction, so the plaintiff applied for a change of venue to the
Circuit Court of Madison County.8 Change of venue was granted.
The defendant then contended in the circuit court, among other
things, that more than two years had elapsed between the accident
and the bringing of the action in the circuit court, and, therefore,
the suit was barred.9 The circuit court so held and dismissed the
suit. The plaintiff then appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme
Court because the validity of a statute was involved, 10 contending
that as the suit was commenced in the city court in apt time, even
though such court had no jurisdiction to hand down any valid judg-
ment, the filing of the complaint there was a sufficient commencement
of the suit under the federal statute. The Illinois Supreme Court
ruled against this contention and affirmed the judgment of dismissal.
Plaintiff then applied for certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court, which was granted." At first that court refused to render a
decision until it was made clear whether the judgment of the Illinois
court was based upon state or federal law, 12 but upon certificate by the
Illinois Supreme Court that such judgment was partially based upon
the federal statute, the Supreme Court of the United States decided'
that the starting of a suit in a court which had absolutely no jurisdic-
tion would be a sufficient commencement under the federal statute so
long as there was a state statute calling for a change of venue to a
court that had jurisdiction. '
5 Herb v. Pitcairn, 377 I1. 405, 36 N. E. (2d) 555 (1941).
6 Goodrich v. Sprague, 376 Ill. 80, 32 N. E. (2d) 897 (1941).
7 Mitchell v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 379 Ill. 522, 42 N. E. (2d) 89 (1942) ; Werner v.
I. C. R. R. Co., 379 Ill. 559, 42 N. E. (2d) 82 (1942).
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 146, § 36.
9 45 U. S. C. A. § 56, was amended Aug. 11, 1939, making the period three years
instead of two.
10 Herb v. Pitcairn, 384 Ill. 237, 51 N. E. (2d) 277 (1943).
1 Herb v. Pitcairn, 321 U. S. 759, 64 S. Ct. 786, 88 L. Ed. 1058 (1944).
12 Herb v. Pitcairn, 323 U. S. -, 65 S. Ct. 459, 89 L. Ed. (adv.) 481 (1945).
Such practice is not novel though rarely used: International Steel & I. Co. v.
National S. Co., 297 U. S. 657, 65 S. Ct. 619, 80 L. Ed. 961 (1936).
13 Herb v. Pitcairn, 323 U. S. -, 65 S. Ct. 954, 89 L. Ed. (adv.) 931 (1945).
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There are few decisions where the courts did not have the benefit
of any kind of statute when asked to decide exactly the same problem,
and all such cases have reached the same conclusion; i. e., that an
action brought in a court having no jurisdiction does not serve to
toll the statute of limitations.14 Such holdings contemplate that in
order to stop the running of the statute of limitations a suit must be
commenced within the time limit laid down by the statute. As a
decision rendered in a court having no jurisdiction is necessarily null
and void and can be attacked directly or indirectly, it follows that the
whole proceeding is null and void and just as if it had never taken
place. In that light, no action has been commenced; hence, there is
nothing to operate to toll the statute.
Opposite results have been obtained with the help of one par-
ticular type of statute, prevalent in most of the states,1 5 which directs
that where an action is brought and dismissed or nonsuited for any
reason other than on the merits a specified time is given, usually one
year, in which to bring another action, even though the statute of
limitations has run in the meantime. Courts have interpreted such
a statute to be applicable to actions dismissed for want of jurisdiction,
as' where the court in which it was brought lacked jurisdiction to
hear the case, even though the statute of limitations had run, because
the case was dismissed for something other than on its merits. As
a consequence, the plaintiff has been granted the specified time in
which to bring another action in a court of competent jurisdiction. 16
Courts speak of statutes of this type as helping the dismissed suit
to toll the statute of limitations. Whether it tolls the statute or merely
extends the period is a matter of conjecture. Whichever way it is
defined, it still gives the plaintiff an opportunity to remedy his error.
The basic case on this aspect is Coffin v. Cottel. 17  While the-
factual situation there involved was different from subsequent cases,
it was the first time that a statute of the type mentioned was given
such construction. The statute of limitations had run while the case
1:4 Smith v. Cincinnati, H. & C. R. Co, 11 F. 289 (1882) ; Fairclough v. Southern
Pac. Co., 157 N. Y. S. 862 (1916) ; Ball v. Hagy, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 318, 54 S. W.
915 (1899). See also Pecos & N. T. Ry. Co. v. Rayzor, 106 Tex. 544, 172 S. W.
1103 (1915); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gordon, 218 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 74
(1919).
15 Illinois has such a statute. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943,' Ch. 83, § 24a.
16 Smith v. McNeal, 109 U. S. 426, 3 S. Ct. 319, 27 L. Ed. 986 (1883) ; Gilmore v.
Gilmore, 270 F. 260 (1921) ; Little Rock, M. R. & T. Ry. Co. v. Manees, 49 Ark.
248, 4 S. W. 778, 4 Am. St. Rep. 45 (1887) ; Rifner v. Lindholm, 132 Kans. 434, 295
P. 670 (1931); Hawkins v. Scottish Union & National Ins. Co., 110 Miss. 23, 69
S. 710 (1915); Wente v. Shaver, 350 Mo. 1143, 169 S. W. (2d) 947 (1943) ; Gaines
v. City of New York, 215 N. Y. 533, 109 N. E. 594, L. R. A. 1917C 203, Ann. Cas.
1916A 259 (1915) ; Meshek v. Cordes, 164 Okla. 40, 22 P. (2d) 921 (1933) ; Stevens
v. Dill, 142 Okla. 138, 285 P. 845 (1930) ; Davis v. Parks, 151 Tenn. 321, 270 S. W.
444 (1924); Tompkins v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 53 W. Va. 479, 44 S. E. 439,
62 L. R. A. 489, 97 Am. St. Rep. 1006 (1903).
1734 Mass. (16 Pick.) 383 (1832).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
was pending in the probate court. The decision rendered by the
judge, on appeal, was declared null and void because the judge was
related to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was nevertheless allowed to
bring another action under the saving clause before a court having
the right to hear the case. The same principle was reiterated in
Woods v. Houghton.1 8 The theory behind these two cases has been
followed in all subsequent decisions. The reasoning therein follows
equitable lines. As the primary purpose of the statute of limitations
is to compel a creditor to enforce his rights within a reasonable time
or lose his remedy, it does seem unjust to say that a creditor who
has tried to enforce his rights within the allotted time but has made
an error in choosing the proper forum should lose his right. The
jurisdiction of courts is not always well defined, and the question
as to how much jurisdiction a particular court possesses may be
debatable. To penalize a person so heavily for a mistake of this
nature where the error was made in good faith is far too harsh. Where
the plaintiff, in bad faith, attempts to confer jurisdiction upon a
court by falsely alleging the existence of other claims in order to
reach the jurisdictional minimum required, however, it has been held
that he should be denied the benefit of the saving clause 19 as has also
been the case where gross negligence was present.
20
The rule above indicated has been applied in law courts but
has also been utilized in equity and federal courts. The saving clause
has been given similar construction, for example, where a suit was
brought in equity and dismissed for want of jurisdiction because
there was an adequate remedy at law;21 where one federal action was
dismissed for want of jurisdiction, but was shifted to another federal
court having competent jurisdiction;22 or where the action was first
brought in a federal court having no jurisdiction and, after dismissal,
was brought in a state court. 23  Only two cases seer to reject this
view, and they have been subjected to criticism. 24
is67 Mass. (1 Gray) 580 (1854).
19 Harden v. Cass County, 42 F. 652 (1890).
20 Warner v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 267 F. 661 (1920).
21 McKinney v. Springer, 3 Ind. 59, 54 Am. Dec. 470 (1851) ; Burns v. People's
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 161 Tenn. 382. 33 S. W. (2d) 76 (1930) ; Swift & Co.
v. Memphis Cold Storage Warehouse Co., 128 Tenn. 82, 158 S. W. 480 (1913);
Hevener v. Hannah, 59 W. Va. 476, 53 S. E. 635 (1906).
22 Sachs v. Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co., 131 F. (2d) 134 (1942). The court construed
a like Illinois statute to be applicable to cases where there is a dismissal for want
of jurisdiction.
23 Park & Pollard Co. v. Industrial Fire Ins. Co., 189 N. Y. S. 866 (1921);
Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Bemis, 6" Ohio St. 26, 59 N. E. 745 (1901);
Edmison v. Crutsinger, 165 Okla. 252, 25 P. (2d) 1103 (1933). Contra: United
States v. Boomer, 183 F. 726 (1910).
24 Solomon v. Bennett, 62 App. Div. 56, 70 N. Y. S. 856 (1901) criticised in Davis
v. Parks, 151 Tenn. 321, 270 S. W. 444 (1924) ; Sweet v. Chattanooga Electric Light
Co., 97 Tenn. 252, 36 S. W. 1090 (1896) criticised in Burns v. People's Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 161 Tenn. 382, 33 S. W. (2d) 76 (1930).
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Justification for the holding in the instant case might also be
found, in some states, on the basis of another type of statute, to wit:
one dealing with change of venue from one court to another. Statutes
of this nature vary widely in their language and operation. Only
two such statutes appear to comprehend the immediate problem here
concerned. Kentucky, for example, provides that when an action is
commenced in due time and in good faith in any court, and it is
subsequently adjudicated that such court has no jurisdiction, then
the plaintiff may, within three months, commence a new action in
the proper court. It is expressly declared that "the time between
the commencement of the first and last actions shall not be counted
in applying any statute of limitations. ' 25 A statute in Texas contains
a substantially similar provision provided there has been no "inten-
tional disregard of jurisdiction. ' ' 26 Under these statutes, the present
question would seem amply settled by express language.
27
Another comparable set of statutes is illustrated by California,
where, upon finding of lack of jurisdiction, the court in which the
case was instituted is empowered to transfer the same to the proper
court wherein the matter is to be treated as if the same had "been
commenced at the time the complaint or petition was filed in the
court from which it was originally transferred. ' 28 The pertinent
Illinois statute would seem to fit in this category except for the fact
that it is silent as to when the action in the court to which it is
transferred shall be deemed to have been commenced. 29 The absence
of the phrase "as if there originally instituted" leaves the statute
open to the construction adopted by the Illinois court in the instant
case that the suit cannot be regarded as commenced in the court to
which it is transferred until the time such transfer takes place.
Addition of that simple phrase to the Illinois statute would seem to
be highly desirable in order to reach an obviously just though dif-
ferent interpretation.
Still another group of statutes provide that if objection to juris-
diction is presented, the court in which the case was instituted shall
transfer the same to the proper court but, upon transfer, the case
shall proceed as if it had been there originally instituted. 0  Pre-
25 Ky. Rev. Stat. 1944, Ch. 413 § 413-270.
26 Vernon's Tex. Stat. Anno. 1925, Tit. 91, Art. 5, § 39A.
27 Analogous statutes may be found In Vt. and W. Va.: Vt. Pub. Laws 1933, Tit.
9, Ch. 72, § 1665; W. Va. Code Anno. 1943, § 3410.
2sDeering's Calif. Code of Civ. Procedure and Probate 1941, Tit. 4, § 396. See
also Thompson's Laws of New York 1939, Vol. II, § 110 of the Civ. Prac. Act; Wis.
Stat. 1943, Ch. 269, § 269.51 (2).
29 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 146, § 36, merely provides that, upon transfer, the
cause "shall be then pending and triable.., as In other cases of change of venue."
30 Conn. Gen. Stat. 1930, Tit. 58, Ch. 288, § 5485; Mass. Laws Anno. 1933, Vol. VII,
Ch. 223, § 15; Utah Code Anno. 1943, Vol. VI, Tit. 104, § 104-4-9.
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sumably, in these states, a failure to raise the question of lack of
jurisdiction will operate as a waiver of that question, although the
statute does not purport to authorize the court to proceed even in
the absence of objection.
Confusion may be generated, however, in connection with statutes
found in still other jurisdictions if attention is not given to a funda-
mental distinction between jurisdiction to pass upon the subject
matter and jurisdiction viewed simply from the standpoint of venue.
It has been said that jurisdiction in the former sense can ne.er be
conferred by agreement of the parties,3 1 hence a failure to object that
jurisdiction is lacking could not be regarded as a waiver of that fact.
If the court has power to determine the subject matter but, for rea-
sons of convenience, it is denied the right to hear because of lack
of venue, the parties well might, in disregard of their own conven-
ience, permit the court where the cause was instituted to proceed
with the case and thereby be barred from raising the fundamental
question including the problem here presented. For that reason it
would seem that statutes such as exist in most of the other states
fall wide of the mark, 2 and little reliance can be placed thereon to
settle the instant problem.
It can be seen, then, that some but too little consideration has
been given to provide adequate relief for the unfortunate litigant who,
through error, institutes his proceeding in the wrong court and does
not learn of his mistake until it is too late to transfer or recommence
his suit in a proper court. Although the United States Supreme
Court suggests a possible form of relief, it would seem that the
adoption of adequate legislation on the subject would be more
desirable.
W. HEINDL
MARRIAGE-ANNULMENT-WHETHER ARREST, OR THREAT OF ARREST,
ON SEDUCTION OR BASTARDY CHARGE WILL CONSTITUTE SUFFICIENT DURESS
TO SUPPORT PROCEEDINGS TO ANNUL A MARRIAGE-The recent case of
Smith v. Saum1 involved a plaintiff eighteen years of age in the service
of the United States Navy who charged that he had been arrested on
the complaint of the defendant, nineteen years of age, accusing him
31 Werner v. I. C. R. R. Co., 379 Ill. 559, 42 N. E. (2d) 82 (1942).
32 Arizona Code Anno. 1939, Vol. II, Ch. 21, § 21-102, indicates that if the action
is brought in the wrong county, i. e. venue is lacking, still the court "may continue
the hearing unless the defendant objects" and wants the action transferred. See
also Iowa Code 1939, Tit. 31, Ch. 488, § 11053; Idaho Code Anno. 1932, Vol. I, Tit. 5,
§ 406-407; Minn. Stat. 1941, Vol. II Ch. 542, § 542-10; Mont. Code Anno. 1935,
(Anderson & McFarland), Vol. IV, Ch. 30, § 9097-8; N. C. Gen Stat. 194-3, Ch. I,
§ 1-83; N. D. Rev. Code 1943, Vol. III, Ch. 28-04, § 28-0407; Oregon Comp. Laws
Anno. 1940, Vol. I, Tit. I, § 1-404; S. C. Code 1942, Vol. I, Tit. 6, § 426; S. D. Code
1939, Vol. II, Tit. 33, § 33.0306.
1324 Ill. App. 299, 58 N. E. (2d) 248 (1944).
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of being the father of her unborn child. After arrest, plaintiff was
surrendered by the civil authorities to the Navy's Shore Patrol; was
imprisoned overnight; was not permitted to consult friends or coun-
sel; but, on the following morning was brought into court where a
Naval Petty Officer, without previous notice to plaintiff and in spite
of his statement that he was not and could not be the father of the
child, told the court that plaintiff, defendant therein, was willing to
marry the complaining witness if the proceedings were dismissed.
The quasi-criminal proceedings 2 were dismissed and plaintiff and
defendant, accompanied by their parents and guardians and a civilian
police officer, obtained a marriage license and had a marriage cere-
mony performed. The marriage was never consummated. Plaintiff's
complaint, after alleging these facts, charged that he was immature
and unexperienced, went through the ceremony against his will in the
belief that the Naval Petty Officer had authority to compel him to do
so and that, immediately after the ceremony, he sought to have the
marriage set aside. Defendant, moved to dismiss the complaint for
want of equity, which motion was sustained by the trial court. Plain-
tiff elected to stand by his complaint and his suit was dismissed.
On appeal, the Appellate Court for the First District affirmed that
decision on the ground that a marriage could not be annulled for
duress where the party seeking the decree married to escape prosecu-
tion, provided the charge was not made maliciously or without proba-
ble cause.
Although the question presented by these facts is one of first
impression in Illinois, it has been presented and decided with similar
results in many other jurisdictions. 3 The case possesses additional
interest, however, because of the likelihood that wartime conditions
will possibly bring similar problems before the courts in the immedi-
ate future. That the facts show actual duress can scarcely be denied
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 17, authorizes a bastardy proceeding which, though
designated as a quasi-criminal action, has more of the characteristics of a civil
action than a criminal one. Section 15 of the statute also provides that if the
parties marry after the child is born, the child shall be deemed legitimate.
Newman v. Sigler, 220 Ala. 426, 125 So. 666 (1930) ; Kibler v. Kibler, 180 Ark.
1152, 24 S. W. (2d) 867 (1930); Griffin v. Griffin, 130 Ga. 527, 61 S. E. 16, 16
L. R. A. (N. S.) 937, 14 Ann. Cas. 866 (1908'); Sherman v. Sherman, 174 Iowa
145, 156 N. W. 301 (1916) ; Shepherd v. Shepherd, 174 Ky. 615, 192 S. W. 658 (1917) ;
Pray v. Pray, 128 La. 1037, 55 So. 666 (1911) ; Wimbrough v. Wimbrough, 125 Md.
619, 94 A. 168, Ann. Cas. 1916E 920 (1915) ; Day v. Day, 236 Mass. 362, 128 N. E.
411 (1920) ; Zeigler v. Zeigler, 174 Miss. 302, 164 So. 768 (1935) ; Blankenmeister
v. Blankenmeister, 106 Mo. App. 390, 80 S. W. 706 (1904) ; Willits v. Willits, 76
Neb. 228, 107 N. W. 379, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 767, 14 Ann. Cas. 883 (1906) ; Ingle v.
Ingle, 38 A. (N. J. Ch.) 953 (1897) ; Scott v. Shufeldt, 5 Paige (N. Y.) 43 (1835) ;
State v. Davis, 79 N. C. 603 (1878) ; State v. English, 101 S. C. 304, 85 S. E. 721,
L. R. A. 1915F 979 (1915) ; Garcia v. Garcia, 144 S. W. (2d) (Tex. Civ. App.) 605
(194,0) ; Harrison v. Harrison, 110 Vt. 254, 4 A. (2d) 348 (1939) ; Thorne v. Farrar,
57 Wash. 441, 107 P. 347, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 385, 135 Am. St. Rep. 995 (1910). See
also Robert C. Brown, "Duress and Fraud as Grounds for the Annulment of
Marriage," 10 Ind. L. J. 473 (1935).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
but, in finding the same did not amount to legal duress sufficient to
warrant annulling the marriage, the court was basing its decision on
principles of public policy. To permit one to marry a person he has
wronged, thereby escaping prosecution for his illegal acts, and then
to allow him to annul the very marriage by which he secured such
relief, would be tantamount to eliminating the right to prosecute for
the original offense against public policy and good morals. 4 The state
has a direct interest in securing the future support of the issue of
such an illegal union and would prefer to insure its legitimation,
whereas annulment would strike at both objectives. As a consequence,
it has been held that a marriage consented to because of some sense
of duty and a desire to right a moral wrong will be upheld even
though there is some evidence of duress.5
In much the same manner, if the plaintiff can be presumed to
have elected to go through with the marriage instead of contesting
the criminal charge, such an election may not be rescinded after the
ceremony even though he was not guilty of the alleged offense.6 In
the early New York case of Scott v. Shufeldt,7 for example, annulment
was denied, insofar as the proceedings were based on a claim of
duress, where the man arrested had married the complaining witness
to escape prosecution even though he discovered that the child, born
a few days before his arrest, was a mulatto whereas both he and the
woman were wholly of white blood. If the criminal complaint is
brought maliciously or without probable cause, the election to marry
rather than defend the charge may be rescinded and the marriage
annulled. Such holdings, though, usually rest on the claim of fraud
rather than of duress, and in most of such cases the party seeking
the annulment appears to have been young and naive.8
A mere mistaken belief as to the nature of the penalty, on the
other hand, is not sufficient grounds for'annulment,9 nor is the fact
that the arrest was illegal or without possibility of conviction.1 0
Cohabitation after the ceremony when coercion has ceased to exist
will, of course, destroy any right that might have originally existed
4 Sherman v. Sherman, 174 Iowa 145, 156 N. W. 301 (1916).
5 Collins v. Ryan, 49 La. Ann. 1710, 22 So. 920, 43 L. R. A. 814 (1897) ; Meredith
v. Meredith, 79 Mo. App. 636 (1899) ; Shepherd v. Shepherd, 174 Ky. 615, 192 S. W.
658 (1917) ; Kelley v. Kelley, 206 Ala. 334, 89 So. 508 (1921).
6 Day v. Day, 236 Mass. 362, 128 N. E. 411 (1920).
7 Scott v. Shufeldt, 5 Paige (N. Y.) 43 (1835).
8 Short v. Short, 265 Ill. App. 133 (1932) ; Smith v. Smith, 51 Mich. 607, 17 N. W.
76 (1883) ; Ingle v. Ingle, 38 A. (N. J. Ch.) 953 (1897) ; Shoro v. Shoro, 60 Vt.
268, 14 A. 177, 6 Am. St. Rep. 118 (1888).
9 Rogers v. Rogers, 151 Miss. 644, 118 So. 619 (1928) ; Ingle v. Ingle, 38 A. (N. J.
Ch.) 953 (1897).
10 Marvin v. Marvin, 52 Ark. 425, 12 S. W. 875, 20 Am. St. Rep. 191 .(1890);
Ingle v. Ingle, 38 A. (N. J. Ch.) 953 (1897); Scott v. Shufeldt, 5 Paige (N. Y.)
43 (1835).
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to have the marriage annulled," unless the party coerced was im-
mature.
12
A nice question is presented where actual and legal duress is
present but the coercion is brought to bear by third persons. The
majority rule seems to be that'the defendant must have participated
in the coercion or knowingly have taken advantage of it in order for
the victim of the duress to succeed in his annulment suit,' 3 although
at least one court has held that participation in the duress will be
irrebuttably presumed where the duress was brought to bear by rela-
tives or close friends. 14 A minority view, followed in Illinois, regards
this as unnecessary, 15 so that the acts of public officials or others, if
constituting legal duress, would be sufficient to support annulment
even though not sanctioned or ratified. The significant feature of the
instant case, therefore, lies in the fact that plaintiff accepted the
election proposed rather than in any question as to the sufficiency
of the duress imposed.
While the result of the instant case would probably not have
been reached if only a simple contract were involved, still, when
public policy and social conventions are considered, the justification
for the holding becomes more nearly apparent.
J. F. PARTRIDGE
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS- POLICE POWER AND REGULATIONS-
WHETHER OR NOT PROVISION IN ZONING ORDINANCE RESTRICTING EXTEN-
SION OF NONCONFORMING USES Is ARBITRARY AND UNREASONABLE-In
Mercer Lumber Companies v. Village of Glencoe,' the plaintiff filed
suit to enjoin the enforcement of a zoning ordinance as applied to
its property and prayed that the same be declared void. Plaintiff's
property had been used as a lumber yard for more than twenty-five
years, which yard was in existence before the original zoning ordi-
nance had been adopted. Such use amounted to a nonconforming use
under the original ordinance and was so treated under the revised
ordinance here concerned which placed the property in three different
zones or classifications, none of which included lumber yards among
permitted uses. The particular provision complained of, however,
stipulated that nonconforming uses in existence at the time the ordi-
11 Thompson v. Thompson, 148 La. 499, 87 So. 250 (1921); Owings v. Owings,
141 Md. 416, 118 A. 858 (1922).
12 Short v. Short, 265 Il1. App. 133 (1932).
13 Shepherd v. Shepherd, 174 Ky. 615, 192 S. W. 658 (1917) ; Fratello v. Fratello,
193 N. Y. S. 865, 118 Misc. 584 (1922); Sherman v. Sherman, 20 N. Y. S. 414
(1892) ; Campbell v. Moore, 189 S. C. 497, 1 S. E. (2d) 784 (1939).
14 Marks v. Crume, 16 Ky. L. 707, 29 S. W. 436 (1895).
15 Lee v. Lee, 176 Ark. 636, 3 S. W. (2d) 672 (1928) ; Schwartz v. Schwartz, 29
Ill. App. 516 (1889).
1 390 Iii. 138, 60 N. E. (2d) 913 (1945).
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nance was passed could be continued and even altered but could not
be extended to exceed thirty percent. of the cubic contents of non-
conforming buildings as they existed on the day the original ordi-
nance was adopted2 although change to conforming uses was per-
mitted. Although a master in chancery found in favor of the plaintiff
and recommended that a whole new zoning ordinance be adopted, the
chancellor decreed that the ordinance was valid and reasonable and
dismissed the suit. On appeal taken directly to the Illinois Supreme
Court because the trial court certified that the validity of a municipal
ordinance was in question, such decree was affirmed, thereby deciding
for the first time in this state that reasonable regulation of the ex-
tension of nonconforming uses was permissible under zoning laws.
Attack on the validity of the ordinance involved in the instant
case, as in all cases of its type, was made on the ground that the
same was unnecessary, unreasonable and arbitrary. The reason for
such a regulation can, however, readily be seen. When a municipal
council decides that, in order to keep the growth of the particular
city under control, it is advisable to enact some sort of zoning ordi-
nance and it takes advantage of the enabling act, the council adopts
such regulation as it deems desirable for the particular situation
before it.3 The validity of such comprehensive zoning ordinances
has been upheld innumerable times as a proper exercise of the police
power 4 provided the operation thereof is reasonable and not arbi-
trary.5 It is likely that, before the adoption of such regulation,
different types of property uses have been in existence for some time
and may be spread irregularly throughout the municipality. When a
zoning plan is adopted, such existing uses will probably not conform
to planned restrictions applicable to the particular use district devel-
oped thereby but, under normal conditions, such zoning ordinances do
not operate retroactively hence the nonconforming uses then in ex-
istence must be allowed to remain.6 Exemption thereof from the
zoning scheme is said to rest on the theory that too great a hardship
would be inflicted and unnecessary destruction of property would
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 24, § 73-1(8), gives the municipality power to regulate
and prevent additions, alterations, or remodeling of existing buildings.
3 The enabling statute in this state is Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 24, § 73-1, et seq.
4 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L. Ed. 303, 54
A. L. R. 1016 (1926) ; Neef v. City of Springfield, 380 Il1. 275, 43 N. E. (2d) 947
(1942). For other cases, see annotation in 117 A. L. R. 1117.
5 Taylor v. Village of Glencoe, 372 Ill. 507, 25 N. E. (2d) 62 (1939) ; Western
Theological Seminary v. City of Evanston, 331 Ill. 257, 162 N. E. 863 (1928). See
also cases cited in 117 A. L. R. 1123.
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 24, § 73-1, expressly exempts existing nonconforming
uses. The validity of such provisions is dealt with in City of Aurora v. Burns,
319 Ill. 84, 149 N. E. 784 (1925), and Illinois Life Ins. Co. v. City of Chicago, 244
Ill. App. 185 (1927). Cases involving the absence of specific provision exempting
nonconforming uses are noted in 86 A. L. R. 684.
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result if such nonconforming uses were made to conform 7 whereas
"zoning seeks to stabilize and not to destroy." Municipal councils,
therefore, usually look to the future and to the eventual confinement
of specified uses into districts created for such purpose.9
To that end, it is necessary to see to it that existing uses which
do not conform are not given an opportunity to expand or to become
even more serious nonconforming uses than they originally were, for
new construction "might destroy a residence district where the con-
tinuation of the original building would be comparatively harmless."'10
The perpetual existence of these nonconforming uses violates the
eventual plan of the municipality" but, by regulating them, they can
be kept under control and may, in the end, be eliminated. 12 Such
regulation would seem to be a legitimate exercise of-the police power,
for that power can be used not merely to maintain the status quo but
also to plan for the future. 13 Regulatory provisions of this nature
have been upheld elsewhere if they take the form of (1) forbidding
the owner of the nonconforming use from substituting another non-
conforming use therefor; 14 (2) denying him the right to enlarge or
change the same structurally; 15 (3) forbidding rebuilding if the ex-
isting building or more than half of it is destroyed unless change is
7 James, Metzenbaum, The Law of Zoning (Baker Voorhis & Co., New York,
1930), p. 287.
8 Edward M. Bassett, Zoning (The Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1926),
p. 105.
9 Thayer v. Board of Appeals of City of Hartford. 114 Conn. 15, 157 A. 273
(1931) ; Town of Darien v. Webb, 115 Conn. 581, 162 A. 690 (1932); Austin v.
Older, 283 Mich. 667, 278 N. W. 727 (1938).
10 Bassett, op. cit., p. 109.
11 Piccolo v. Town of West Haven, 120 Conn. 449, 181 A. 615 (1935); Conway v.
Atlantic City, 107 N. J. L. 404, 154 A. 6 (1931).
12 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 24, § 73-1, contemplates the gradual elimination of non-
conforming uses which existed before the ordinance was passed. Metzenbaum,
op. cit., p. 288, declares: "Within a period of another twenty years, a large num-
ber of such 'non-conforming uses' will have disappeared, either through the neces-
sity of enlargement and expansion which invariably is forbidden by ordinance, or by
the owners realizing that it is unwise and uneconomic to be located in a district
which probably is not suitable for the non-conforming purpose, or by obsolescence,
destruction by fire or by the elements, or similar inability to be used; so that
many of these non-conforming uses will 'fade out,' with a resulting substantial
benefit to all communities."
13 Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 497, 234 P. 388 (1925), affirmed in
274 U. S. 325, 47 S. Ct. 549, 71 L. Ed. 1074 (1927).
14 Wilson v. Edgar, 64 Cal. App. 654, 222 P. 623 (1923) ; Collins v. Moore, 211
N. Y. S. 437, 125 Misc. 777 (1925).
15 Rehfeld v. City and County of San Francisco, 218 Cal. 83, 21 P. (2d) 419
(1933) ; Selligman v. Von Allman Bros., 297 Ky. 121, 179 S. W. (2d) 207 (1944) ;
State v. City of New, Orleans, 171 La. 1053, 132 So. 786 (1931) ; Austin v. Odler,
283 Mich. 667, 278 N. W. 727 (1938) ; Green v. Board of Com'rs of City of Newark,
131, N. J. L. 336, 36 A. (2d) 610 (1944) ; Meixner v. Board of Adjustment of City
of Newark, 131 N. J. L. 599, 37 A. (2d) 678 (1944) ; Ventres v. Walsh, 201 N. Y. S.
226, 121 Misc. 494 (1923).
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made to a conforming use;16 or (4) directing that where there has
been a discontinuance of the nonconforming use, whether involving
change to a conforming one or not, the property can never again be
used in the nonconforming fashion.17 The instant provision is not
unlike these in character.
It is obvious that as regulations of the types mentioned are but
part and parcel of comprehensive zoning ordinances, they must be
enacted under the same power as the more general ones, to-wit: the
police power. Such power has always been subject to the limitation
that it must be reasonably and not arbitrarily exercised.' 8 The com-
plainant in the instant case contended that the provision involved was
not a proper and legitimate exercise of that power for it depreciated
the value of property in that, by limiting any extension to thirty per
cent. of the existing use, it would prevent the owner from getting
the maximum value out of the same. When determining the relative
reasonableness or unreasonableness of a provision of this kind, the
court may take into consideration the damage done to property
values, 19 but that is but one factor to be recognized and is never
controlling by itself.20 If the courts were to allow that factor alone
to determine the validity of such regulations, reason dictates that no
zoning ordinance could ever be upheld as "every exercise of the police
power is apt to affect adversely the property interests of somebody." 21
Comparing the provision in the instant case with like provisions
under other ordinances which have been declared to be reasonable, the
inevitable conclusion is reached that the instant provision creates no
such extreme hardship as to warrant calling it unreasonable. In fact,
it is far more generous in its provisions than was the case in the fol-
lowing illustrations. In two Louisiana cases, for example, the owners
of nonconforming uses in existence before the ordinance was passed
were forced to liquidate within one year, but such provision was up-
held. 22 Hadachek v. Sebastian23 provides an example of even more
16 State v. Hillman, 110 Conn. 92, 141 A. 294 (1929) ; Koeber v. Bedell, 3 N. Y. S.
(2d) 108, 254 App. Div. 584 (1938).
17 State v. Baumauer, 234 Ala. 286, 174 So. 514 (1937) ; Town of Darien v. Webb,
115 Conn. 581, 162 A. 690 (1932).
18 See cases cited in note 4, ante.
19 Reschke v. Village of Winnetka, 363 Ill. 478, 2 N. E. (2d) 718 (1936) ; Taylor
v. Village of Glencoe, 372 Ill. 507, 25 N. E. (2d) 62 (1939).
20 In Geneva Inv. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 87 F. (2d) 83 at 90 (1937), the court
said: "The loss sustained by appellant through depreciation in value, if the ordi-
nance is sustained, while proper for the consideration of the court, Is not con-
trolling, for if the police power is properly exercised, loss to the individual is a
misfortune which he must undergo as a member of society." To the same effect
are Delano v. City of Tulsa, 26 F. (2d) 640 (192g), and Marblehead Land Co. v.
City of Los Angeles, 47 F. (2d) 528 (1931).
21 Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 497 at 512, 234 P. 388 at 394 (1925).
22 State v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929) ; State v. McDonald, 168 La.
172, 121 So. 613 (1929), cert. den. 280 U. S. 556, 50 S. Ct. 16, 74 L. Ed. 612 (1929).
23 239 U. S. 394, 36 S. Ct. 143, 60 L. Ed. 348, Ann. Cas. 1917B 927 (1915).
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extreme hardship. There, a brickyard had been operated before the
zoning ordinance was enacted but the owner was forced to abandon
the property, worth approximately $800,000 and which could be used
only as a brickyard because of the clay pits there present, by reason
of the new ordinance. The court said, in substance, that if private
interests stood in the way of community development, they must give
way or else the municipality could not properly expand. In still
another case, that of Cole v. City of Battle Creek,24 no structural
change whatsoever, was permitted even though such change might
decrease the cubical content of the nonconforming use. The court
said any change which would prolong the life of such a use would
violate the spirit of the zoning ordinance and should be prohibited.
Any increase in either the cubic contents or size of existing non-
conforming uses has also been forbidden under other decisions. 25 In
the light of such decisions, the ordinance here concerned was far from
unreasonable.
A further argument was presented on the ground that, in order
to be a proper exercise of the police power, the regulation had to
bear some substantial relation to the health, safety, or general welfare
of the people. 26 It was claimed that the limitation on extension to
thirty percent. was arbitrarily arrived at and that if an extension of
that size would do no harm then one amounting to fifty or sixty
percent. would present no such widespread difference as to create a
condition which would result in an adverse effect. It is clear, though,
that courts will not disturb the judgment of the council and will
treat its findings as conclusive unless there is definite demonstration
that there is no relation between the ordinance and the public safety,
health, or general welfare sought to be subserved thereby. 27 For that
matter, even where there is doubt either way as to the reasonableness
or unreasonableness of the provision, the court will not substitute its
judgment for that of the council. 28 There was a difference of opinion,
in the instant case, between the findings of the chancellor and those
of the master in chancery on the question of the reasonableness of the
provision. The upper court seized upon this as a basis for holding
24 298 Mich. 98, 298 N. W. 466 (1941).
25 City of Lewiston v. Grant, 120 Me. 194, 113 A. 181 (1921) ; DeVito v. Pearsall,
115 N. J. L. 323, 180 A. 202 (1935) ; State v. Stegner, 120 Ohio St. 418, 166 N. E.
226, 64 A. L. R. 916 (1929). See also American Wood Products Co. v. City of
Minneapolis, 21 F. (2d) 440 (1927). Other comparisons are provided by the cases
cited in footnote 15, ante, where the provisions involved were similar to the one
in the instant case.
28 Forbes v. Hubbard, 348 Ill. 166, 180 N. E. 767 (1932); Harmon v. City of
Peoria, 373 I1. 594, 27 N. E. (2d) 525 (1940). See also 117 A. L. R. 1123.
27 Neef v. City of Springfield, 380 Ill. 275, 43 N. E. (2d) 947 (1942) ; Speroni v.
Board of Appeals of City of Sterling, 368 Ill. 568, 15 N. E. (2d) 302 (1938).
-a8Avery v. Village of LaGrange, 381 Ill. 432. 45 N. E. (2d) 647 (1942) ; Burk-
holder v. City of Sterling, 381 Ill. 564, 46 N. E. (2d) 45 (1943).
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that, because of the doubt engendered, it would not overrule the
judgment of the municipal council.
In considering whether or not any relationship exists between a
regulation of this type and the police power, the court should be
careful as to the way in which it approaches the problem. It could
easily find that no such relationship exists, for an extension or change
in a nonconforming use might not immediately or directly affect the
neighbors or the general public in any detrimental fashion at the
particular time. That fact was noted by the California court in
Rehfield v. City and County of San Francisco 29 when it stated: "The
finding that the public welfare would not be in danger is beside the
point. Obviously, a rezoning would not cause injury to the public,
but the whole value of zoning lies in the establishment of more or
less permanent districts, well planned and arranged. If, upon the
complaint of the owner, the courts are to re-examine each instance of
inclusion or exclusion of property from a district, solely with regard
to the dangerous or non-dangerous character of the particular struc-
ture, and irrespective of the general scheme of the ordinance, then
there is, of course, no possibility of ever achieving successful zon-
ing."30  The court should, therefore, take the whole zoning scheme
into consideration along with the immediate problem as it affects the
complainant's property in order to determine whether the extension
or change would be detrimental to the people not alone at present but
also in the future. That reasoning, at least, has been followed in some
cases. In one of them, for example, a dairy was denied a permit to
put up brick walls to take the place of the rotted wooden ones.
3 '
Constructing brick walls would not immediately and directly be in-
jurious to the public health, safety, or general welfare but rather
would promote safety. Nevertheless, it was said that by putting up
brick walls the life of the nonconforming use would be prolonged,
thereby defeating the general scheme of zoning, so that the ultimate
good would have to outweigh the immediate benefit.
3 2
The principles involved in zoning problems of this character are
simple and can easily be stated. Everyone holds his property subject
to the reasonable and proper operation of the police power.3 3 The
court, in determining whether that power has been used in a reason-
able and proper manner, must examine the facts involved in each case.
What is reasonable and what is capricious in a given situation is
generally reflected in contemporary thought. As people come more
29 218 Cal. 83, 21 P. (2d) 419 (1933).
3o218 Cal. 83 at 86, 21 P. (2d) 419 at 420.
31 Selligman v. Von Allman Bros., 297 Ky. 121, 179 S. W. (2d) 207 (1944).
32 Refusal to permit extension of a dairy has been sustained on the same
ground: State v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N. W. 451 (1923).
33 Zadworny v. City of Chicago, 380 Ill. 470, 44 N. E. (2d) 426 (1942).
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and more to the realization that it is better to segregate industrial
and marketing districts from residential ones, they will regard as
reasonable that which previously might have been deemed arbitrary
restraint. It can be expected, therefore, that even more rigid and
still harsher regulations than those here concerned will be upheld as
being reasonable and proper. The Illinois Supreme Court, at least,
has set its foot in the right direction.
W. HEINDL
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-ACTION AGAINST THIRD PERSONS FOR
EMPLOYEE'S INJURY OR DEATH-WHETHER NOTICE OF REJECTION OF
BENEFITS OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT Is REQUIRED OF AN ILLE-
GALLY EMPLOYED MINOR-In Oran v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corporation'
the plaintiff, an illegally employed minor not quite sixteen years of
age, brought suit by next friend to recover for injuries sustained
while making a delivery when crowded against a parked car by the
defendant's truck. The defendant's answer set forth the fact that
the parties concerned were all subject to and operating under the
Workmen's Compensation Act. 2 Plaintiff's reply did not deny such
fact but alleged that, as he was illegally employed, he had a right to
bring his own action at law. Without notice or leave of court,3 de-
fendant filed a further pleading in which it was alleged that plaintiff
had not, within six months of the accident, 4 filed a rejection of his
right to claim benefits under the compensation law. After verdict for
plaintiff at a trial on such issues, the trial court granted the defend-
ant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. On appeal by
plaintiff, the Appellate Court for the First District reversed such
decision on the ground that the time limitation contained in Section 6
of the Workmen's Compensation Act did not run against a minor
until a legal representative had been appointed for him.
Although that holding had been indicated as probably being the
law of this state,5 the instant case presents the first clear-cut answer
to a query propounded in the columns of the Chicago-Kent Law
1324 Ill. App. 463, 58 N. E. (2d) 731 (1944).
2 Such defense proceeded on the theory that any cause of action was transferred
to the plaintiff's employer: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 166.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 156, contemplates that further pleading after the
reply may be permitted only "as ordered by the court."
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48 § 143, as amended in 1931, states in part: "... Pro-
vided, further, that any illegally employed minor or his legal representatives shall,
except as hereinafter provided, have the right, within six months after the time
of injury or death, to file with the commission a rejection of his right to the bene-
fits under this Act, in which case such illegally employed minor or his legal repre-
sentatives shall have the right to pursue his or their common law or statutory
remedies to recover damages for such injury or death ....
5 Kijowski v. Times Publishing Corp., 298 Ill. App. 236, 18 N. E. (2d) 754 (1939).
Judgment therein was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court on other grounds:
372 Ill. 311, 23 N. E. (2d) 703 (1939). The precise question concerned was not
discussed In the Supreme Court opinion.
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Review a short time ago6 and confirms the judgment of that writer to
the effect that the time limitation imposed by Section 6 would not
operate against the minor prior to the appointment of a guardian. 7
To reach that result, the court relied on earlier Illinois cases" indicat-
ing it to be the pronounced public policy of the state to guard the
rights of minors, from which premise it was reasoned that it would
not be safeguarding the rights of minors to construe the statute so
as to require the minor to do that which could not validly be done.
Strict enforcement of Section 6, as written, would work a contradic-
tion by requiring the minor to give notice of rejection within six
months after injury, but at the same time not allowing him to give
such notice except through a duly appointed representative. The
court, therefore, seems to have arrived at the only logical and prac-
tical solution.
Illinois appears to be the only state to enact legislation requiring
an illegally employed minor to file notice of rejection before permit-
ting him to pursue common law remedies and, in view of the decision
in the instant case, it would appear unlikely that similar legislation
would be promulgated in other states. In contrast, many states have
expressly provided that any time limitations specified in their com-
pensation laws are not to apply to or operate against minors until
after a guardian or other legal representative has been appointed to
act in the minor's behalf. 9 While some state statutes stipulate that
a minor, for all purposes, stands in the same relation to the compen-
sation laws as do adults, 10 such statutes reflect a definite minority
view. In the other states, although no specific mention of the point is
made in the state statute, it is likely that the same result as that
0 See Angerstein, "The Child Labor Act and the Workmen's Compensation Act
of Illinois," 20 CHiCAGo:KENT LAW REVIEW 193, particularly p. 202 (1942).
7 Judicial notice of Mr. Angerstein's analysis of the problem was given: 324 Ill.
App. 463 at 476, 58 N. E. (2d) 731 at 736.
s Waechter v. Industrial Commission, 367 Il1. 256, 11 N. E. (2d) 378 (1937);
Wallgreen Co. v. Industrial Commission, 323 Ill. 194, 153 N. E. 831, 48 A. L. R.
1199 (1926); Maskallunas v. Chicago and Western Indiana R. Co., 318 Ill. 342,
149 N. E. 23 (1925); Hasterlik v. Hasterlik, 316 Ill. 72, 146 N. E. 498 (1925);
McDonald v. City of Spring Valley, 285 Ill. 52, 120 N. E. 476, 2 A. L. R. 1359 (1918).
9 Ark. Laws 1939, p. 777, § 18(c); Cal. Deering Code, Labor, Part IV, Ch. 2,
§ 5408; Ida. Code Anno. 1932, Ch. 12, § 43-1206; Ind. Burns Stat. Anno. 1933,
§ 40-1413; Kas. Gen. Stat. 1935, Ch. 44, § 509; Ky. Rev. Stat. 1944, § 342.210; Me.
Rev. Stat. 1930, Ch. 55, § 22; Mo. Rev. Stat. 1939, Vol. I, § 3695a; Mont. Rev. Code
1935, Ch. 256, § 2900; N. J. Rev. Stat. 1937, Vol. II, Ch. 34:15, § 51; N. Y. Baldwin
Cons. Laws 1938, Vol. VII, Work. Comp. Law, Art. 7, § 115; N. Car. Gen. Stat.
1943, Vol. II, Ch. 97, § 50; Okla. Stat. 1941, Tit. 85, § 106; S. Car. Code 1942,
§,7035-52; Tex. Vernon's Civ. Stat. Anno., Art. 8306, § 13; Vt. Pub. Laws 1933,
Tit. 30, § 6540; Va. Code Anno. 1942, Ch. 76A, § 1887(50); Wyo. Rev. Stat. 1931,
Ch. 124, § 108.
10 Ala. Code 1940, Tit. 26, § 296; Ariz. Code Anno. 1939, Ch. 56, § 56-974; Colo.
Stat. Anno. 1935, Ch. 97, § 288(b); Minn. Stat. 1941, Vol. I, Ch. 176, § 18.
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achieved in the instant case would be obtained, particularly when it
is borne in mind that a minor is incompetent to act for himself and,
being presumed to be without knowledge of his legal rights or obli-
gations, is under special protection from the law until a guardian or
other competent person has been chosen to represent him.
R. K. POWERS
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See also Chattel Mortgages, Secu-
rity Transactions
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1943-1944 57-9
Enforcement: Whether "no-action"
clause In corporate mortgage
bond prevents suit at law after
maturity at Instance of holder
of minority Interest In outstand-
ing Issue 185-7
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1943-1944 162-6
Bibliography: Rhyne: Airports and
the Courts 104
Rhyne: Municipalities and the
Law in Action 285-6
Officers, a g e n ts and employees:
Whether civil service examinees,
wrongfully refused certification
and appointment, may recover
wages for elapsed period be-




Police power and regulations:
Whether or not provision in
zoning ordinance restricting ex-




See also Vendor and Purchaser
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1943-1944 65-73
Limitation of action: Whether pe-
riod of limitation in malpractice
case begins to run from time of
operation or cessation of treat-
ment 20-1
PARTNERSHIP
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1943-1944 10
PAWNBROKERS AND MONEY
LENDERS
Who are pawnbrokers and money
lenders: Whether or not an oc-
casional small loan constitutes
doing business within meaning
of "Small Loan Act" so as to
subject lender to the penalties
thereof 272-5
PAYMENT
Recovery of payments: Whether
money paid with full knowledge
of facts and ignorance only of
legal rights may be recovered
in absence of compulsion
275-8
PRACTICE AND PLEADING
See also Actions, Adoption, Ap-




In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1943-1944 16-40
Rights and remedies of taxpayers:
Whether taxpayer must make
demand upon municipal corpo-
ration as condition precedent to
filing suit in its name and on its
behalf 79-82
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1943-1944 12-3
Restrictions on enforcement: Effect
of "no-action" clause on the
rights of holder to sue at law at
maturity date 185-7
Dismissal and nonsuit: Whether or
not order of dismissal may be
vacated and case reinstated
against a defendant whom the
plaintiff has voluntarily caused
to be dismissed from suit 327-9
Parties: Whether "no-action" clause
in corporate bond prevents suit
at law after maturity by holder
unable to secure sufficient per-
centage of holders to join in de-
mand on trustee 185-7
Whether or not a person suing as
representative of a class must
show a common or joint Inter-
est with those represented not
only in the question litigated
but also in the remedy sought
82-e
Whether taxpayer must make de-
mand upon municipal corpora-
tion as condition precedent to
filing suit in its name and on its
behalf 79-82
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
See also Master and Servant
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1943-1944 8-10




See also Automobiles, Practice
and Pleading, Workmen's Corn.
pensation
Dismissal and nonsuit: Whether
order of voluntary dismissal
may be vacated and cause rein-
stated against defendant with-
out necessity of service of addi-
tional process 327-9
Service of process: Acquisition of
jurisdiction over foreign corpo-
ration not licensed to do busi-
ness within state 7
Q
QUASI-CONTRACTS
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1943-1944 15-6
REAL PROPERTY
See also Deeds, Easements, Land-
lord and Tenant, Titles, Wills
and Administration
SALES
See also Corporations, Creditors'
Rights, Tawation
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1943-1944 14-5
Conditional sales: Whether or not
transaction in form of condi-
tional sale but in fact one of
lending and borrowing is effec-
tive against the rights of sub-
sequent judgment creditor of
purported conditional vendee
194-7
Securities: Whether public offering
of unqualified stock by owner
through licensed broker violates
securities law 188-91
SECURITY TRANSACTIONS
See Pawnbrokers and Money
Le~iders, Suretyship
PROPERTY
See also Landlord and Tenant,
Real Property, Security Trans-
actions, Titles
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1943-1944 55-7
PUBLIC UTILITIES
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1943-1944 160
Mistake of law and fact: Whether
money paid with full knowledge
of facts and ignorance only of
legal rights may be recovered in
absence of compulsion 275-8
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1943-1944 51-3
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1943-1944 57-60
Conditional sales: Whether or not
transaction in form of condi-
tional sale but in fact one of
lending and borrowing is effec-
tive against the rights of sub-
sequent judgment creditor of
purported conditional vendee
194-7
Limitations on remedies: Whether
"no-action" clause in corporate
bond prevents suit at law after
maturity by holder unable to
secure sufficient percentage of
holders to join in demand on
trustee 185-7
SURETYSHIP
Rights of surety: Whether applica-
tion of payments made by prin-
cipal debtor on secured claim Is




In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1943-1944
164 and 166-71
TITLES
See also Deeds, Easements,
Vendor and Purchaser
Dower: Whether ex-spouse who ob-
tains divorce decree is obliged
to comply with Section 19 of
Probate Act to acquire dower
interest in deceased ex-spouse's
realty 313-7
Estate upon condition: Whether
deed by holder of title, joined
in by spouse, to un-named
grantee designated as "sur-
vivor" operates to create estate
upon condition in favor of
spouse 335-6
Possession: Whether tenant, to de-
feat action for possession by
landlord, may show that land-
lord has been divested of title
by tax deed 96-9
TORTS
See also Actions, Courts, Dismis-
sal and Nonsuit, Highways,
Negligence
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1943-1944 65-75
VENDOR AND PURCHASER
See also Deeds, Sales, Titles
Deeds: Whether or not deed deliv-
ered after death of one of co-
grantors is effective to transfer
the interest of the surviving
grantor 263-6
Municipal corporations: Tort liabil-
ity of municipal corporation for
negligent acts of servants and
agents 164
TRADE REGULATION
See also Brokers, Commerce
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1943-1944 160-2
TRUSTS
In .general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1943-1944 63-5
Business trusts: Liability of holders
of beneficial interests in busi-
ness trust owning bank stock in
event bank becomes Insolvent
256-8
Establishment and enforcement of
trust: Whether broker who
guaranteed signature of trustee
on transfer of stock belonging
to trust is liable to beneficiaries
for trustee's conversion in ab-
sence of notice of trustee's in-
tention to convert 99-103
Revocable trusts: Whether revoca-
ble trust of personalty created
by husband defeats widow's
statutory right to share in his
estate 87-9C
Validity: Whether trust in land for
benefit of alien may be declared
invalid at instance of state 3304
Identity of property sold: Whether
vendor is responsible for error




See also Erecutors and Admini8-
trators
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1943-1944 60-3
Dower right: Whether ex-spouse
who obtains divorce must com-
ply with Section 19 of Probate
Act to acquire dower in de-
ceased ex-spouse's ,realty 313-7
Rights and liabilities of devisees
and legatees: Whether election
to renounce provisions of will
of deceased husband may be
made by consular officer on be-
half of nonresident alien widow
in absence of express power of
attorney authorizing such action
197-201
Whether the sale of the subject of
a specific devise pursuant to
court order for the benefit of
incompetent testator works an
ademption 278-82
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
See also Labor Law
In general: Survey of Illinois law
for the year 1943-1944 10
Action against third persons for em-
ployee's injury or death:
Whether notice of rejection of
benefits of workmen's compen-
sation act is required of illecally
employed minor 355-7
Bibliography: Horovitz: Injury and
Death Under Workmen's Com-
pensation Laws 202-
Judicial review: Appellate Proced-
ure in Workmen's Compensation
Cases 205-32 and 287-312
Alias writs 224-5
Amending the praecipe 220-4
Designation of parties 211-2
Historical development of power
287-91
Jurisdiction to review 207-8
Jurisdiction under 1915 amend-
ment:
1. As to questions of fact 291-4
2. As to questions of law 294-6
3. Other incidents 296-9
Jurisdiction under 1921 amend-
ment:
1. Changes in statute 299-301
2. Scope of jurisdiction:
a. circuit courts 301-7
b. Supreme Court 307-12
Necessity for administrative re-
view 209-11
Payment of costs 217-20
Preparing the appeal 213-4
The bond 225-30
The praecipe 214-6
1. Amending praecipe 220-4
The record 230-2
Time for appeal 208-9
Venue 212-3
ZONING
See also Municipal Corporations
Nonconforming uses: Whether or
not provision in zoning ordi-
nance restricting extension of
nonconforming uses is arbitrary
and unreasonable 349-55
